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Abstract
America is increasingly, and perhaps overwhelmingly, becoming a society characterized by
political divisiveness. At its most extreme form, Hannah Arendt argues such a division can make
us vulnerable to a loneliness that destroys our confidence and leaves us dependent on ideologies.
A renewed sense of spirituality and intellect are prime candidates for helping us develop a
healthy relationship with ourselves that can help counteract this loneliness. Not only that, but
fully accessing our intellectual and spiritual sides can give us the confidence to tackle democratic
republican citizenship the way Thomas Jefferson envisioned it. Here, Jacques Rancière helps us
to construct a model of intellectual access that makes intellect essential, inclusive, and intuition
adjacent. William James then contributes, along with Hanan A. Alexander, to a broader
understanding of spirituality that opens up new worlds of spiritual access for students. Together,
these two forms of access make up an intellectuospiritual approach to education that can help
inform how we think about teacher professionalism, the relationship between private and public,
and the potential for spirituality within schools.
Key terms: intellect, spirituality, democratic republic, education, America
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Introduction
I am a firm believer in the powerful lessons we can learn from children. Largely
untouched by many of the practical concerns of the ‘adult world,’ many people have marveled at
the appalling potency and simplicity of youthful idealism. Anyone who has spent much time
around children has, no doubt, witnessed their joyous resiliency, creative curiosity, insightful
wisdom, and profound passion, even among those who have suffered horrendous abuse. The
internet is full of impassioned calls for love and justice from our youngest citizens. It is a
wonder, in some ways, that few people would cite children among their role models. Our
perceived age and experience might cloud our judgement in that vein, though it is certainly valid
to admire the ability of adults to understand the pragmatic side of important issues. One area,
however, where children provide an especially insightful example is their innate educational
practices. Linguistic experts from around the world have praised the ability of the young to
immerse themselves in a language and playfully master it. Parents joke, routinely, that their
toddler’s favorite response to them is “oh…why?” Educational theorists have discussed these
interesting observations in several influential arguments, but none have quite captured their bare
essence the way Jacques Rancière has.
Looking at educational institutions in his native France, Rancière sees something entirely
different from our natural trial-and-error educational processes. He sees teachers telling,
assigning, structuring, and saying “hold on.” Across the Western world, the current educational
best-case scenario often involves spending our first five years on earth in this playful world of
inquisition, only to be ripped from that routine and placed in the care of teachers who spoon-feed
us like helpless dependents. Some people experience this hard right turn sooner, having even this
natural and critical opportunity for developing agency stolen from them by circumstance. This
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transition from active and joyful learning to passive and rigid schooling is often subtle, but its
implications are anything but meek. Not only does it impact children’s self-esteem and
development of healthy relationships, but it also alters how they view truth and knowledge.
Because of these implications, the academic shift when we enter school and the approach to
intelligence that informs it are as important to educational discourse as any questions we
currently face.
Beginning with intelligence, it is important to note that the quest for knowledge serves as
a pillar of American life. The way we approach intelligence guides the bulk of our political,
commercial, and educational actions. This is because each of those spheres is inherently social
and interpersonal, and our understanding of intelligence informs the expectations we carry into
these social interactions. When we assume, for example, that humans are limited in their ability
to search for and use knowledge, we have reason to look for those limits in the people we engage
with. That expectation, then, can quickly become a reason to try to exploit others and find
advantageous positions over them. It might even lead us to assume that those around us are
similarly driven to look for advantages, making us cynical in our relationships. These tendencies
towards exploitation and distrust can be summed up in the old-fashioned term ‘gamesmanship,’
where one player always looks to exploit the flaws of their opponent. The jump to gamesmanship
is not inevitable, but it becomes so much easier when we carry these assumptions. Few people
would think they could exploit an equal or someone with similarly great potential for growth and
knowledge. Instead, we would turn to hard-fought persuasion and mutual discourse, which are
much healthier options, particularly in the context of a democracy.
Our ideas about human intelligence impact education in a similar manner. We approach
teaching in a way that depends, at least in part, on what we assume about a student’s intelligence.
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With the absolute best intentions at heart, we often subject ‘more capable’ students to less
handholding, while we usher off ‘less capable’ students into private sessions and extra lessons.
The differences become increasingly noticeable as we progress through the years of their
education. In most cases, students are gradually treated more like capable adult intellectuals as
they age. In the meantime, however, teachers withhold certain pieces of information and types of
problems from students because the students are just ‘not ready’ to deal with them yet. All of
these decisions are guided by certain assumptions about the capabilities of individual students
and those in their age bracket. Rarely, particularly in our current educational climate, are
students given free rein to try and fail. These questions are not limited to educational and social
contexts, either. Even our private lives and the way we understand our identities, a large
component of early education, are guided by these definitions of intelligence. In the truest sense,
our ideas about human intelligence shape everything that we think is possible for our lives, for
the lives of those around us, and for our system of government. This is how a quaint philosophy
about the word intelligence quickly balloons into a vital educational and societal concern.
For these and many other reasons, intelligence is one of the most consequential paradoxes
in American life. I call it a paradox, because, despite how deeply engrained intelligence is in our
lives and society at large, we withhold parts of it from our youngest citizens for nearly their
entire childhood and adolescence. This, I should add, is wholly different from concerns about a
child’s innocence and exposure to certain content, something I will say more about later on. It is,
seemingly, an approach to our children that is completely incompatible with our American
ideals. But first, we should talk about what exactly we mean by intelligence. An expansive and
useful idea, it can loosely be defined as the ability to demonstrate mental excellence and is
commonly connected to both IQ tests and, more recently, Howard Gardner’s multiple
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intelligences.1 This definition is complicated, however, by the fact that we often place three
distinct terms within its umbrella: intelligence, intellect, and smarts. If intelligence is the
excellent use of our reasoned minds, intellect involves that same excellence but within the
constraints of a discipline-specific tradition.2 Intellect, in this frame, is intelligence plus
accountability to a larger community. Often, this gets connected with academic work, where
academic communities serve as the anchor, but academics are not the only place people can use
their intellect. In contrast to intellect, the only things keeping intelligence from becoming pure
subjectivism are the conditions of logic that both it and intellect require. Additionally, the fact
that intelligence has become a more all-encompassing term while intellectual pursuits have
stayed more in the realm of academia makes this distinction even clearer. More people would
claim that they aim to be intelligent than intellectual, even though this, arguably, should not be
the case.
It is also important to remember that the external world, especially in the context of
schools, deeply impacts how we understand our intellect and identity. These external forces,
however, are not the only limiting factors. There is something to be said for the fact that we, at
times, impose restrictions on ourselves. This self-restraint likely comes, at least in part, from the
assumptions we internalize from the society around us. If I live in a culture that constantly
discusses the limits of human intellect and talent, I might inevitably start to apply that logic to
how I understand myself. For those who believe they are on the lower end of the intellectual
spectrum, non-intellectual and non-rational outlets become a crucial alternative to the world of
Gardner’s ideas, while incredibly popular and useful in other contexts, do not help reach the goals I hope
to accomplish here. Too often, the compartmentalized intelligences Gardner championed are used as excuses to
focus on singular areas of life and skill development at the expense of others. I am more interested in pushing people
to be well-rounded and embrace growth in all areas.
2
We can define reason, for the sake of fully fleshing out these terms, as structured thinking anchored to
observable evidence. This is especially relevant for William James and Jacques Rancière, who discuss the need for
our theories to be grounded in the tangible and recognizable reality around us.
1
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intellect. These internalized assumptions, in short, impact our self-view as much as our view of
others. This is especially true when we reflect on our intellectual qualities. Reason and
deliberation are crucial human abilities, but we also tend to ignore them in certain circumstances,
either because of our perceived inabilities or other, more positive motivations. Think especially
about superstitious sports fans who refuse to wash their game day outfits during a win-streak;
think about the countless unfounded fears people have about flying in a plane, or, on a different
level, think of religious people across our world who base many actions on faith and tradition.
The idea of smarts emerges in this window and creates a new distinction. As a pragmatic
quality akin to common sense, smarts differentiates itself from intelligence and intellect by its
lack of concern for reason. A smart person can cleverly navigate their context but is not
necessarily bound to logic or the contours of a larger rational community. It is the most attractive
refuge, in many cases, for people who might feel excluded from intellect and intelligence.
Smarts, intelligence, and intellect, therefore, form a series of concentric circles, with the quality
of smartness being the most all-encompassing and imposing the least restrictions. Because of this
relative freedom, smarts is often far and away the most accessible form of mental excellence.
People can develop smarts entirely through their individual efforts and do not need to rely on
cultural and educational gatekeepers in order to achieve. Within the context of a larger society,
the relative inclusiveness of smarts also makes intellect and intelligence appear more exclusive
and elitist. This elitism, in turn, can engender a good deal of justified animosity towards the
world of intellect in particular. Historian Richard Hofstadter argues that anti-intellectualism,
rather than being a pure ideology, is a persistent thread within American history that has always
been a part of our civic and cultural life. In this sense, he is not defining anti-intellectuals3 by a

“Anti-intellectuals” is itself a term that Hofstadter would likely regard as useless or meaningless, because
there is no identifiable set of qualities that would make someone an “anti-intellectual.”
3
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set of distinct qualities, but as a category of diverse responses to the presentation of
intellectualism throughout history.4
One of these responses comes from recognizing that pure reliance on cautious reason
would remove many of the dynamic and interesting qualities of life. We would, for example,
have no cause to value the fantastical imaginations and pure innocence of children as much as we
do. The value of creativity and spontaneity seems undeniable, but there are deeper reasons for
abandoning our intellectual focus. Intellect, after all, leaves plenty of room for creativity and
spontaneity. Faith, on the other hand, is much less compatible with the, often proof-laden, world
of science and reason. William James ventures into issues of faith in his lecture “The Will to
Believe,” a plea to consider the place in our lives for non-rational belief, a more substantive
companion of anti-intellectualism.5 Moving beyond the naïve idea that faith and intellectual
pursuits ought to hold each other at arm’s length, James reminds us of the potential for a
stunning interplay between the two, something we rarely consider in the context of schools.
Historians and political thinkers like Hofstadter add to the complexity of this image by
reminding us of the complex legacy of intellectualism, specifically within the foundational
American Protestant Christian tradition. Together with Hofstadter, James pushes us to consider
that something more significant than hierarchy and apathy inspires our intellectual restraint. As a
natural extension of this argument, religious motivations become a key issue for schools that
hope to more fully realize intellectual access for all students. Still, it is hard to argue for a change
in how we approach intellect when a large portion of the population feels cut off from intellect
and would rather focus on other concerns. Instead of being satisfied with the chasm between

4

Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. (New York City: Vintage Books, 1962).
William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, (Urbana: Project Gutenberg,
2009). These two (non-reason and anti-intellectualism) do less direct interaction than coincidental collaboration.
5
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religion and intellectualism, then, we should seek to marry the two and move forward together
with our eyes on expanding educational access in all areas.
As I mentioned, the process of freeing themselves from the rules of reason allows smarts
and anti-intellectualism to bind well to the essential human element of faith. Here faith,
especially as James outlines it, runs directly counter to the world of reason because it allows us
to view claims as true without clear evidence or justification. While James would argue that we
all have faith in something, there are many people who, more than the rest of us, hold up faith as
the driving force in their life.6 By bringing these people and this key component of human life to
our attention, anti-intellectualism highlights the centrality of faith in American life and
introduces faithful access as a second key consideration for modern American school reform.
The United States may be secular by the letter of the law, but Hofstadter confirms the undeniable
fact that non-rational principles, like religion and custom, hold a special place in the hearts of
most, if not all, Americans.7 It is remarkable and unacceptable, given the sheer magnitude of
faith in American society, that school reform efforts fail to take religion and faith seriously.
All of this, no doubt, is complicated by our fixation on a separation between the
institutions of Church and State. This belief is almost a prerequisite for being American. It is so
firmly entrenched in our public lives, especially the world of schools, that most of us consider it
a doctrine. Robert Nash, however, challenges the notion that this legal separation excludes
religion from the educational sphere. He argues that the separation between church and state “is
actually a low, rather than a high, wall,” suggesting that schools might have the ability to truly

6
James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 2009. It is worth noting, for the sake
of full disclosure, that I would consider myself one of those people who lets faith guide my life more than a
prototypical intellectual might. I would also confess a degree of anti-intellectual sympathies, especially concerning
the stereotyped “east coast elite.”
7
Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, 1962.
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engage, in non-discriminatory ways, with religious and spiritual issues.8 Nash sits as part of a
larger argument about the need for enhanced religious pluralism in schools, public and private
alike. Among the active voices in this discourse are Katherine Simon, Robert Kunzman, Nel
Noddings, and Walter Feinberg, each of whom brings an important element to the table but
ultimately fall short of aligning themselves with the question of access Rancière raises.
Suzanne Rosenblith, for her part, adds to this discourse as she expands on the ideas of
Robert Wunthow about the importance of a more reflective and demanding form of pluralism.9
This reflective pluralism is an important step towards civic virtue, but it falls flat still without a
substantive understanding of how spiritual issues fit within our schools. Here, Hanan A.
Alexander offers us this much-needed substance, dreaming up a more dynamic and holistic
understanding of spirituality, one that schools could take pride in helping their students
develop.10 Fully realizing the intellectual equality Rancière, Jefferson, and others dream up, in
many ways, requires this type of grappling with spirituality. To ignore spiritual needs and fall
into the classic and underwhelming idea of religious neutrality could be devastating for any
serious hope at improving educational access, as well as religious and political coexistence.
The concept of spirituality, then, serves as a natural entry point for conversations about
people’s faith. Going beyond a religious or mystical framework, Alexander broadens our
understanding of spirituality to include any identity that gives us a larger context of belief,
community, and transcendence in answering life’s big questions. This, naturally, includes
religious traditions and faith-based communities, but can also include other communities and
Robert J. Nash, “A letter to secondary teachers: Teaching about religious pluralism in the public schools,”
in Educating citizens for global awareness by Nel Noddings (New York City: Teachers College Press, 2005). 99.
9
Suzanne Rosenblith, “Beyond coexistence: Toward a more reflective religious pluralism,” Theory and
Research in Education 6 (2008): 107-121. Robert Wuthnow, America and the Challenges of Religious Diversity
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
10
Hanan A. Alexander, Reclaiming Goodness: Education and the Spiritual Quest (South Bend: University
of Notre Dame Press, 2001).
8
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group-belongings.11 Philosophy, for example, often provides people with a community and
defined customs in their efforts to reach for transcendent truth. Though they both exist in the
context of groups, a spiritual person sets themself apart from an intellectual person by their
willingness to accept conclusions on faith alone. In many contexts, then, spirituality is viewed as
an antagonist to the intellectual life, but it does not need to be that way. Intellectual and spiritual
exercises might actually serve as complements to each other, rather than enemies. The vision of
education I synthesize here looks to build on this potential marriage, especially considering how
damaging the divide between them has been within American society. As part of this, building
on the legacy and ideas of many great thinkers, I suggest that we begin to think of well-rounded
people not as intellectuals or as spirituals, but as intellectuospirituals.
American psychologist and philosopher William James speaks to conversations about
both sides of the coin: intellectual availability and spiritual cultivation. When combined with
Rancière, James helps provide an alternative to restrictive and hierarchical schooling. In the
process, he relies on a novel concept of truth,12 while Rancière rests on a firm belief in the power
of all people to express and verify their thoughts.13 When brought into conversation with
Alexander, however, James points more strongly to the need for a holistic understanding of
spirituality. The goal of school reform, in the first case, is to increase intellectual access for
students and help them have confidence in their ability for intellect. The goal of the second is to
reconcile the relationship between intellect and spirituality, increase spiritual access for students,
and, in the process, open up a national dialogue that makes the goals of the first case possible.

11

Alexander, Reclaiming Goodness, 2001.
William James, Pragmatism (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1991).
13
Jacques Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation, trans. Kristin
Ross. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).
12

13
This, as I have said, works on the assumption that efforts to increase intellectual access cannot
move forward without recentering on what it means to be intellectuospiritual.
The fake news era and its attacks on truth add a particularly strong urgency to these ideas.
On both sides of the political spectrum, we are abandoning traditional avenues of information,
standards of dialogue, and sources of authority. While healthy skepticism about our news
sources, our customs, and our authority figures can provide important balance, we seem to have
crossed a line into disillusionment and disorder. I hardly need to say it, but when two people
from opposing political orientation can no longer agree on a common set of assumptions,
productive discourse between the two sides quickly breaks down. For Hannah Arendt, this
change in our discursive viability might be a result of an American mass culture that is ripe for
loneliness and totalitarian domination. Intense personalization, sharp detachment from
transcendent group affinities, and the aches of technological isolation all characterize our modern
lifestyle. These phenomena, recognizable as products of either modernization or
“suburbanization,”14 make all of us particularly vulnerable to these lonely and ideological vices,
even if totalitarianism is not an inevitable consequence.15
Because these habits are baked into our cultural atmosphere, we all fall victim to them at
various points, regardless of our efforts to resist them. At the same time that modernity is
pushing us into an increasingly isolated existence and leaving a spiritual void, it is also pulling us
to continue pushing for the innovation and intellectual development that have characterized
much of the modern era. Despite this, our drive for intellect, evident in the Space Race, the rich
history of American inventors, and the pride we take in our robust, though flawed, public and

14

I liken this to suburbs because many modern suburbs, including those that I grew up in and around,
cultivate very impersonal neighborly associations and an emphasis on superficiality and/or isolation.
15
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. (Orlando: Harcourt Inc., 1976).
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higher education systems, is not uniformly available. Some people are held at arms-length from
intellect because of a hierarchical and limiting culture, while others are denied even the basic
components of satisfactory education. This inequality of access has important implications for
the society we hope to build and maintain, especially one that is built on unfulfilled notions of
equality.
The legacy of the Western intellectual tradition, which takes on a distinct flavor in the
United States, provides a rich but underutilized conceptual basis for understanding the
relationship between intellect and government. Those in the global West, like those in the global
East, have tried to define this interplay for a long time and with varying concern for people’s
daily lives. Our founding generation, standing on the shoulders of Western giants, looked to
synthesize and perpetuate that intellectual legacy by creating a new approach to intellect in
government: what is now often described as the great American experiment. Imperfectly realized
ideals of freedom, human rights, political participation, and equality find themselves woven into
this American fabric. Above all of them hang the two counterbalanced forces of our ‘democratic
republic’: democracy and republicanism. These overlapping concerns provide a sturdy frame
around our ideals, but one we often neglect as we lose a genuine understanding of our founding
virtues and wade further into the abyss of lonely modernism.
One could even go so far as to argue that the ideas that once created a dynamic body of
revolutionary principles and counter-cultural action have become stale as our culture has
gradually crystallized and institutionalized them. Think, for instance, about the way Americans
often approach voting. The power to vote was bestowed upon us by our founding generation like
a political sacrament but over time we have eroded them to the point of being a mindless
obligation. Our jury duty process provides another example. Thomas Jefferson regarded jury
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duty as a fundamental check on our judicial branch and a vitalizing opportunity for civic
participation.16 Years of complacency and selfishness, however, have turned this beautiful
process of judicial involvement into a chore we try to escape. Even the prospect of deciding on
school tax levies, which is a crucial component of any thriving public education system, has
become a dry, party-line exercise, detached from community account. There is something to be
said for having simple, recognizable civic values. Overly complex or obscure definitions of
citizenship are much more likely to alienate people. We can, however, become too simplistic,
effortless, and stale in how we approach citizenship, a concern that the United States
exemplifies. Not to mention, stability and universality alone are insufficient tools for preserving
the true nature of our nation and for inspiring political involvement.
In fact, America is much more than a set of rigid beliefs, established once and declared
valid forever. The country we love is a vibrant and pluralistic community bound together by a
radical, action-based philosophy of self-government. It is a nuanced and two-part statement that
government works best when its power sits in the hands of the people under the presumption of
equality. Left stagnant and neglected, however, that principle of equality leaves the door open for
an emptiness and relativism that misconstrues our liberties and ignores our political duties.
Under the same conditions, uncritical versions of liberty can rationalize hierarchy and abandon
ideas about equality for the sake of personal advancement. We need to do more, then, to reaffirm
and reengage with those elements of democracy and republicanism that so many of our country’s
citizens hold dear.
A revised history curriculum would be a fantastic first step, but these issues run much
deeper. Our founders fled the obstinate grip of a tired monarchy over two hundred years ago, but

Brian W. Dotts, “Beyond the Schoolhouse Door: Educating the Political Animal in Jefferson’s Little
Republics,” Democracy & Education, 23 (2015), p. 7.
16
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children often mimic their parents. Can anyone honestly argue that we are immune from this
same monarchy-like power-hoarding? In more ways than one, it often seems like it is knocking
on our doorstep. Of course, modern America is not a monarchy in structure, but the way we
maintain our values is anything but democratic. When I talk about maintaining our values, I am
reflecting on the fact that monarchical government relies on unsubstantiated and absolute power
in the hands of one person or family. This lack of justification and qualification does not just
apply to the power structures, however. It also applies to the value systems within that state. If
our democratic republic is going to be different than the monarchy we ran away from, it needs to
do something different. We need to rely on a democratic and republican maintenance of our
values. This is a key point of distinction. Values, like governmental power, are shaped through
argumentation, changing discourse, and popular legitimization. Democratic republics can only be
permanently sustained through democratic and republican care of our collective values. In other
words, if we want to avoid falling back into the pit of tyranny, we should avoid the easy
temptation to cultivate an uncritical attitude towards our value systems. Tyranny over our values
might well be the first step to tyranny in our governmental systems. Instead, we should be urgent
in maintaining and reevaluating both our principles and how well we live up to those standards.
In light of all of this, the problem facing American education is, ultimately, two-pronged,
and I hope to tackle each issue in turn. American education needs to fight two simultaneous
urges: first, the urge to assume unequal intellectual access, and second, the urge to ignore
spirituality. Both are questions of access, a principle that has driven the discourse surrounding
American education for many years. My argument, as I have stated, is that equal access to
intellectual and spiritual development is crucial for cultivating healthy, productive, and
accountable citizens and, consequently, a healthy society. Neither of these access questions is a

17
simple task, but the authors I have mentioned above suggest a useful framework for approaching
this difficulty. My argument will proceed in four parts. First, I will look to further clarify the
foundational elements of an American democratic republic and gesture towards where we have
fallen short. The viability of an American government depends on a shared assumption that all
citizens are capable of civic intellect. In practice, we have often been much more likely to
assume a large portion of our population is incapable of fulfilling their duties. Thinking about
founding principles, there is a strong case to be made that a revitalization of our values is in
order. That process begins with our definitions of intellect, the history of which I will also briefly
introduce in this section. Even further, though, Arendt suggests there is a tangible danger in our
current approach. It is not a stretch, considering Arendt’s ideas about totalitarianism, to say that
modern American culture contains all the ingredients that would make us vulnerable to the
destruction of our democracy. Her ideas, I hope, will add important context and urgency to my
brief analysis of where we stand relative to the ideas of our founders and how those ideas bring
us into questions of educational access.
I will then look to lay out the critique Rancière levels against widespread, though
unpopular, pedagogies. In his work, Rancière finds a restrictive, tiered philosophy of intellect
that saturates not only French society but arguably the larger Western world.17 Any system that
assumes humans have different mental potential, he argues, opens itself up to the clutches of
tyranny and hinders the progress of democracy, because it withholds access from those who are
‘less capable’.18 Hofstadter provides a prime example of these assumptions as he describes ‘life
adjustment’ curricula, a predecessor of modern home economics classes, and their theory that

I should note that Rancière’s work recounts the ideas of Joseph Jacotot, and France is the context of their
criticism, not the explicit target.
18
Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster, 1991. Rancière is not explicit in any emphasis on democracy, but
the values underlying his ideas are consistent with those that are commonly ascribed to American democracy.
17

18
some students could not handle academic work.19 This, however, is just one instance of
difference-based, spoon-fed pedagogies, which Rancière calls ‘explicative,’ that have dragged
down American education and society. Rectifying the corruption within our intellectualizing
institutions, Rancière argues, will require a great measure of intentional action and restructuring
how we understand education. This is the first great philosophical challenge facing American
public schools, but through an approach that emphasizes the essential, inclusive, and intuitive
qualities of intellect, Rancière begins to sketch out a possible alternative.
With this view of intellectual access established, I will transition to the second great
challenge: the importance of spiritual access within any school reform attempts. Building on
Alexander’s ideas about what it means to approach spirituality holistically, I will argue that we
can greatly expand how we understand the spiritual realms of our lives. Already a large player in
American life, further increasing the scope of spiritual concerns should make it even more
necessary that all public institutions, especially schools, do more than just nod to those concerns.
Yes, the integration of spirituality and intellectual development faces a staunch roadblock in the
‘Separation of Church and State,’ but Alexander and Nash urge us to recognize this as a
challenge rather than an impossibility.20 The stakes are simply too high. Religious home- and
private-schooling are waging a war of attrition against our public schools in many corners of the
country precisely because educators have too often failed to take religious concerns seriously.
Rectifying our total ignorance of human spirituality will not be a miracle cure, but it will open up
the ocean of dammed-up possibilities hiding on either side of the divide.

Hofstadter, 1962. This is very similar to the academic tracking that we see in today’s schools.
Nash, “A letter to secondary teachers,” 2005, 99. Here, he means the law creates minimal expectations
(i.e., the absence of state-sponsored religion) rather than a stern ban on all religious and spiritual interaction.
19
20
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To meet these two pressing challenges, I will look, in the end, to synthesize the
intellectuospiritual philosophy that emerges in the discourse between these various authors. In
the process, I will discuss three potential implications for this approach: discursive teaching,
private-public balance, and sanctuary schools. As these implications make clear, an
intellectuospiritual would have both personal and societal benefits. On a personal level, opening
up the intellectual and spiritual possibilities within our mandatory schooling efforts will allow
students more room to develop their identities and relationships with the world around them. By
further taking seriously the potential and interests in each student, we ought to be better able to
offer students the resources they need to become the people they aim to be. Taken together
across the millions of American persons, this becomes the societal benefit. The proper
functioning of a democratic republic is reliant on the efforts of dynamic, well-adjusted, and
accountable citizens. Citizens with increased intellectual confidence and an enlarged sense of
spiritual validation will almost certainly provide more useful and thorough efforts and therefore,
better serve our ideals. If the goal of American education is to preserve and fulfill our ideals,
preparing citizens for self-government, then the responses these authors suggest are a vital piece
of how we should progress in our educational approaches.
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Chapter 1: The American Democratic Republican
Society has a way of shaping every educational effort that crosses its path. Whether we
view those efforts as preparation for citizenship, independent efforts contextualized by
citizenship, or something else entirely, schools cannot justify avoiding their surroundings. For
American education, this means grappling with our political identity as a democratic republic.
These two ideas, democracy and republicanism hang over every inch of American life,
maintaining their assumptions and demands. It goes without saying, then, that understanding the
nature of democratic republics is essential to any criticisms and proposals connected to American
education. James Carpenter and others argue that one of the best vehicles for developing this
understanding is the writings of our founding generation, such as Thomas Jefferson. In
characterizing Jefferson’s opinions on education, for example, Carpenter notes that we often
focus on his democratic ideals and ignore the strong republican undercurrents that formed his
thinking. Situating Jefferson in the context of the American Revolution, he emphasizes that an
aversion to aristocracy often moved Jefferson towards republicanism. Carpenter urges us to
avoid looking only at Jefferson’s democratic ideas, emphasizing the importance of viewing both
democracy and republicanism in tandem.21 The same can be said about American society as a
whole. In our efforts to plant our feet firmly in democracy, we sometimes forget the important
role of our republican identity.
This may, in part, be because democracy is so familiar to most Americans. Briefly
described, it is a process of governing defined by the direct consent and influence of the
governed through the vessel of elections. Traced back to ancient Athens, it often relies on ideas
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of equality like those “self-evident” truths stated in The Declaration of Independence and
marches hand-in-hand with historical efforts to expand the voting franchise towards its fullest
extent.22 We often take the idea of innate human equality as the democratic rationale for popular
sovereignty and the expansion of voting rights. Our equal status in nature suggests that we ought
to have equal opportunity to influence the shape of our collective governance. Interestingly,
however, despite widespread embrace of the term, Americans of different political stripes have
fought and feared the actual principles of democracy as far back as the founding generation.23
Jefferson himself was attacked for being ‘too democratic’ throughout his political career due to
his support for significantly expanded voting rights among white men and for the widespread
establishment of democratic institutions.24 This is just to mention that democracy, while often
viewed lovingly in modern discourse, is not always met with such appreciation in practice,
particularly by those who benefit from its malfunctions. This also highlights the importance of
remembering the second part of our national identity and the complementary services it offers.
The distinguishing features of a republic, in contrast to those of democracy, might be
more foreign to most citizens, as they were to me before conducting this research. Carpenter,
nodding to Jefferson, looks to define the American ideal of republicanism in juxtaposition with
“monarchies and rigid aristocracies”. Where these other forms of government turn to their
leaders to secure the rights of citizens, the new American republic is an endeavor to regard “the
people as the guardians of liberty”. From this perspective, the distinctive republican emphasis is
on “the protection of individual liberty” through the efforts of each governed person.25 This
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connection with effort also brings ideas like hard work and accountability into play as crucial
components of republican government. Adding to this picture, M. Andrew Holowchak
summarizes Jefferson’s republicanism through concern for “equal and exact justice to all men;
peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations; jealous care of the right of election by
the people; honest payment of debts; and freedom of religion, of presses, and of persons.”26
Clearly, republicanism, like democracy, is an intricate concept and one that is hard to pin down.
One way of beginning to differentiate republicanism from democracy, however, is through
emphasizing its explicit focus on liberty, where democracy focuses on equality.
As he tries to further clarify this distinction, Carpenter looks at how each idea manifests
itself in the realm of education. “Democratic schooling,” he argues, aims to “prepare students to
be active citizens” through the mechanics of political participation and collective decisionmaking. Put another way, its primary emphasis is on cultivating the skills and interpersonal
qualities that make up an ideal democratic citizen. Where “republican education” differs is in its
“efforts to prepare students to be good citizens” as opposed to “active” ones. Good citizenship,
Carpenter argues, is commonly defined through knowledge of political processes and fulfillment
of civic duties.27 Despite being distinct, good citizenship and active citizenship might often be
inseparable, and Johann Neem argues just that: few people would want just good citizens or just
active citizens.28 Even if the distinction is overly simplistic, it presents a useful framework where
democracy focuses more on action and republicanism focuses more on goodness. Understood in
this way, democracy concerns itself more with the principles of discourse and collective
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participation under the assumption of equality, while republicanism looks to derive duty and
obligation from the power and liberty bestowed on the people. This is the distinction Carpenter
looks to situate Jefferson within, and it is the framework most useful for thinking about a
revitalized American education system.
Though democracy often seems to be a subset of republicanism, the two do not
necessarily reach the same conclusions. Carpenter notes that Jefferson’s republicanism leaned
towards a fear of centralized governmental institutions and a desire to maintain localized
control.29 A popular democracy, where all citizens voted for a small number of distant and
centralized officials, would embody this fear. Discussing the deficiencies of a popular
democratic model, Jefferson claims that classically understood democracy is “the only pure
republic, but impracticable beyond the limits of a town.”30 Larger cities, states, and countries, he
suggests, contain too much complexity to effectively rest their governance on a simple poll of
citizens. Popular democracy might be democratic in nature, but, at least for Jefferson, it would be
far from the republican ideal. Some level of representation is needed to allow individuals to elect
people from their community who can come together in the context of the larger country. In this
model, individual citizens should keep their democratic influence but refocus the majority of
their concern on the local scale instead of the national one.
That said, even our modern representative democracy might be too centralized and
disconnected to match up with the republican ideal. Dotts reminds us that Jefferson and other
members of our founding generation believed “that public officials will forget their attachment to
the people as they move further away from the wards” and from local concerns.31 As we groan
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about the detachment of recent presidents and federal legislators—some so far removed that they
famously could not recall the price of common groceries—the fear of distance rings all too true.
For this reason, among others, republicanism concerns itself primarily with movement away
from centralized power structures. This movement, however, does not necessarily get us to our
democratic ideals. Feudalism, while an extreme example, was a highly decentralized form of
state government that contained no democratic elements. Similarly, democracy concerns itself
with each citizen having representation and voice in shaping the government, but this concern
does not always result in the republican ideal. Democracy and republicanism, approached in this
manner, represent two distinct forces that can be brought together to create a democratic
republic. Discussing American government as fundamentally one or the other would risk missing
an important part of what helped make the American experiment so unique and revolutionary.
With this loose understanding of democracy and republicanism in place, we can turn to
think about our political present and how well our understandings of education and intellect
embody these principles. Democracy, in this context, demands that we move towards recognition
of all people as equal partners in our collective self-governance. By granting each person a vote
of equal value in our electoral processes, we establish this partnership. In the context of intellect,
it dares us to argue that our equality in creation also means equal ability to access intellectual
life. If we argue, as we do, that all humans are created equal, we must be referring to equality of
something, after all. That something is not physical appearance, genetic makeup, or particular
circumstance. It must, then, be some intangible worth that gets its meaning from an equally
distant claim about our potential. The one thing that ties us together as equals at birth is our
potentiality, our status as a blank slate ready to be filled out. Differences emerge over time, but
we begin with this recognition of equal capacity. This can extend, under democratic principles,
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to our potential for intellect. To argue that some of us were created with inferior intellectual
capacity would contradict the stated beliefs of our founders. American democracy, in other
words, requires that we think about equality in this way. To strive for anything less is to be
satisfied with failure and incompleteness.
What Jacques Rancière provides, in contrast to the dominant American narratives, are
alternative conceptions that invigorate equality, liberty, and truth, central components of
intellectual life. Think, first, about the democratic ideal of equality. In the American sense,
equality shows up in our capacity for qualities like intellect. This alone does nothing for us,
however, if it is just an idle quality of our birth. Rancière proposes a shift in approach where the
idea of equality moves from an abstract aim of our actions to an assumption that underlies those
actions. In other words, equality is not the box we aim to build, but the wood we build with. This
change would give us both an excuse and a reason to start treating each other as equals
immediately, instead of waiting for some distant utopian future.32 It moves us beyond the simple,
though significant, step of recognizing equality as something that can only exist in action. This
approach of thinking about equality as something that needs routine attention and operates best
as an assumption turns our static idea of ‘equality under the law’ on its head. It borrows the idea
that we should hold equality as an assumption in our actions but rejects the notion that we could
ever do that institutionally. Systems, Rancière suggests, can never cultivate an equal view of
others for us, and to expect that cultivation neglects our responsibilities to each other. We need to
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actively take up the mantle of equality in each moment of our lives, he argues, and make a
conscious decision to carry that assumed equality into our interpersonal lives.33
If democracy finds room for this dynamic new understanding of equality, then a turn to
republicanism sets our sights on liberty. Republicanism demands that we place the power to
affect change and the intellectual ability needed to exercise this power in the hands of the people.
For a republican society to meet its proper function, it needs to trust governed and equip them to
secure their liberty. It is from this perspective that Jefferson derives the need for a public
education that can cultivate responsible and effective republican citizens.34 To ensure the
survival of a nation that rests its hope in the people, the state should be sure that at least some
people are “rendered by liberal education worthy to receive, and able to guard the sacred deposit
of the rights and liberties of their fellow citizens.”35 For a republican government, preparing
citizens to use and protect their liberties is a vital activity. We cannot orient our efforts and hold
our government accountable without the tools a public education provides. Here, the equalitydrenched assumption that we are all capable of a high level of intellect frees up the selfconfidence we need to take up our individual roles and safeguard our liberties against corruption
and overreach. Democracy and republicanism, at this moment, come to bear on the same idea
from distinct perspectives. Democracy pushes us to believe in a less limiting view of intellect on
the basis of equality while republicanism does so on the basis of liberty. Instead of focusing on
these beliefs themselves, as we are conditioned to do, it seems important to focus, as William
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James might, on how they reconstruct intellect through their tension, on the practical and
pragmatic consequences.
If we do this, we might find that the two ideas are necessarily intertwined. In order to
operate under a democratic assumption of equality, we need to lean on Rancière’s new
conception of liberty, as he argues that only liberated people can see and hold that assumption.36
Liberty, far from negative, constitutionalized freedoms,37 is a single and twofold process. All it
requires is for us to recognize our partnership in the equality of intellect between humans and the
discourse that becomes possible through that equality. The first step in liberty, therefore, is
recognizing our ability to be equal to others. False ideas of either superiority or inferiority
destroy any possibility of fruitful discourse with our neighbors. Though it might seem like a
liberated state, the superior or inferior person has lost the ability to access a large portion of
human possibilities. Put differently, without confidence in our equality, our liberty becomes a
feeble and insecure brand of individualism. This is the first step towards liberty, but it also
contains the second within its process. The act of establishing this confidence requires respecting
the equal capacity of others since equality demands some other person to whom we can be equal.
In this way, the singular process of recognizing equality completes liberty for both us and those
around us.
It seems, then that the republican view of liberty draws on the democratic ideal of
inherent equality, and therefore cannot exist with singular consequences. Importantly, we need to
remember that our government does not liberate us. We free ourselves and, in the process, free
others with whom we come into contact. These are the mechanics of Rancière’s vision for
liberated equality and they are at the foundation of a Jeffersonian democratic republic. The
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particular medium of self-liberation that Rancière has in mind is the realization that we are all on
equal footing when it comes to intellectual capacity, the understanding that no one has grounds
to claim greater fitness for intellectual achievement. Such a realization frees us to reach for the
fullest extent of our potential, instead of some imaginary limitation placed on us externally. Of
course, I would not need to say any of this, nor would Rancière, if these ideas were already
normalized in our world. Looking back at American history, we find just the opposite: ideas of
superiority and inferiority often go hand-in-hand with any discussion of intellect. Before we
move forward, it is worth taking some time to look at this historical American relationship with
intellect and how it has shaped the discourse we occupy today.

The American Intellect
Like great art, many consequential ideas are best understood in the context of opposites
or alternatives. Contrast is a powerful tool in revealing the finer details of an object of focus.
Intellect is no exception. Jacques Rancière has much to say about what intellectual possibility
looks like, but fully comprehending American intellect requires a more particular view, a more
contextualized view. Richard Hofstadter recognized this fact when he sought to provide a
detailed account of anti-intellectualism throughout American history. While I will turn to his
discussions of religious and educational anti-intellectualism later, the political responses to
intellect are relevant here because they add crucial insights to this chapter’s discussion of a new
political intellectualism. The challenges and skepticism of anti-intellectualism must be addressed
if we have any hope of bringing forward a richer appreciation of intellect.
Beginning in an age where politicians were expected to be well-rounded, intellectual
gentlemen, Hofstadter notes a radical shift across time in how we have shaped and developed
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American politicians. It was the era of Jefferson, he argues, that first saw a political figure being
attacked for their intellect and interest in higher ideas. The founding generation had been able to
avoid this form of division primarily because of the lack of interest in specialization and
expertise within American culture. As these expert forces grew and class divisions became more
salient, however, even the founding generation could not escape the charges that intellect was a
hindrance for a politician. To have intellect was to be specialized and to have a diminished
ability to relate to generalists, a term that described the majority of Americans at the time. The
conflation of populism and anti-rationalism around this time also laid a political foundation for
anti-intellectualism that operated in much the same way as its religious counterpart: through the
medium of class conflict. This medium, Hofstadter notes, inspired William Manning to criticize
education in America, with its colleges primarily serving the rich and its grammar schools
primarily serving the poor.38
In addition to this educational divide, the harmful consequences of commodifying expert
work were driving forces in the distaste for college and ‘higher’ professions. The moment that
expert professionalism became closely linked with rising service fees, those who could hardly
afford to pay those fees had reason for frustration. Many, no doubt, felt they were being priced
out of bare necessities without much, if any, say in the matter. At the same time as these
discontents were rising, the development of American democracy was throwing fuel on the
populist fire. So long as Manning’s observations about the disparate access to high levels of
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education rang true, popular democracy would always be a system that communicated a
preference for intuition over reason.39
This is because of the nature of decision-making in a democratic state. When your
government claims to run on the will of the majority, some characteristics of the majority will,
understandably, take on a higher status than those of the minority. Why would a country
willfully deny its citizens something that it knew they needed to create an effective democracy?
In the absence of a better answer, it might be natural to assume that no country would do
something like that, and, therefore, that our country must prefer letting intuition outshine reason
in the sphere of governance. For those of us with the benefit of a broader perspective, we might
recognize that the failure to provide adequate education does not necessarily mean that we
prioritize common sense and intuition. Many Americans, however, have seemed to lack this
important perspective across history and are naturally drawn to the conclusion laid out above,
and for good reason.
The two classes of educational opportunity in America, as mentioned, drove those who
were unable to access collegiate education towards what we might call common sense or
intuition. This, in turn, led to the rise of politicians who fed off of this intuition-driven America.
Andrew Jackson, for example, benefitted from the first major popular shift away from intellect
and abstract knowledge. Hofstadter notes that Jackson was widely viewed as a practical,
effective leader who was relatable for many common people across the country. His rise,
alongside that of Davy Crockett, the nearly deified congressman from Tennessee, helped bring
practically oriented, common-sense decision making into the national spotlight. These people
were admired for their ability to “keep touch with the common people and yet move comfortably
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and function intelligently” in the political world. In other words, they were relatable and acted
with recognizable smarts. In time, they became the perfect point of reference for anyone who
believed that intuition and non-academic knowledge could get someone just as far as academic
knowledge. Such a shift in the confidence of the common man made it increasingly hard to
justify the existing educational structures across America, particularly those of higher education.
Over time, the creation and maintenance of an elite class of intellectuals, by way of colleges,
paved the way for a distaste towards academics that might not have existed otherwise.40 Intellect,
too, fell out of favor as those who bore its name became political targets.
As Hofstadter wades into the nineteenth century, the political reformist movement and its
head-on engagement with burgeoning political machines become the primary driver of his
interest. These reformers, working in response to the increasingly unruly political appointment
system in America, rallied around an interest in “improvement of the civil service.”41 This
improvement, they argued, was the keystone issue for restoring America’s founding glory. It also
pitted them directly against the political machines that had come to define American
government, which relied on the existing system of patronage appointments and quasibureaucratic manipulation.
The primary concern of reformers, the need for renewed competence standards, was
especially controversial for the established organizations. As reformers operationalized efforts
for increased civil servant competence, a natural progression was the consideration of civilservice exams. For many established politicians, however, the use of merit-based assessment
reeked of academia and threatened to push the common man back to the fringe. Despite
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hesitancy, Hofstadter reminds us that these two ideas, accessibility and assessment, were and are
far from mutually exclusive. Even during the reformist days, the tests proved themselves to be
within reach for the common person and the proportion of college-graduates among those who
matriculated through this exam was pedestrian.42 Still, many held to the belief that tests
inevitably create accessibility issues.
Though they were factually inaccurate, there is an argument to be made that those who
doubted the accessibility of the tests were right. Hofstadter describes a reform movement that
was interested in making it harder for unqualified, unfit people to take up positions of political
power.43 These changes would make it harder for certain people to take on roles as civil servants,
but those accessibility limits would not necessarily fall along lines of socioeconomic class.
Underprepared and poorly conditioned candidates rise out of every socioeconomic bracket.
Because of this and despite the weak construction of assessment critiques, concerns about meritbased systems do point to a valid issue with the use of civil service exams. Access to education,
depending on how the service exams are constructed, could create a clear advantage for certain
people, especially those who were college-educated. This concern carries through into modern
debates about education reform as well. Meritocratic systems are dangerous when the
educational opportunities that surround them are distributed unequally. The straightforward
response to this problem, and the component that political reformers seemed to ignore, is
equalization of educational opportunity, however that might come about. More expressly, it is an
equalization of intellectual and spiritual access.
Issues of competence and standards were not the only source of division during the
reform movements, however. A second key component of this clash was the complicating effect

42
43

Hofstadter, 1962.
Hofstadter, 1962.

33
of gender, specifically masculinity. Professional politicians succeeded in arguing that reformers
and the values connected to them embodied femininity. The backdrop of the American Civil War
also helped them in these efforts. By using a tactic that persists to this day and has roots at least
as old as Ancient Greece, the political machine manipulated the glory associated with military
service. Reformers, too often, avoided military service during times of conflict as they studied in
college and benefited from the wealth of their families. This avoidance of the dirty work required
to maintain unity and national defense did not sit well with many. Soon the familiar term ‘freerider’ became a common refutation of reformers and their ideas.44
This strategy might be an inevitable consequence of living in any society that involves
militarized self-defense, as it continues to have a hold on our political and moral judgments to
this day. The effects do not stop with military service either. Participation in a classically valued
sport such as football, basketball, or soccer also commands a certain respect and characterization,
and rightfully so.45 Athletics and military service have traditionally been valued in society for a
reason, and there is a strong argument to be made that those people who have not participated in
either are lacking something crucial in their character development. That said, there is no
escaping the recklessly gendered notions that have surrounded these ideas, nor the harmful
consequences they have created by further defacing the reputation of intellect.
These are just two of the many legitimate threads that have distinctly characterized the
political image of academics and highly educated people in America. As with any rule, of course,
there are exceptions. Theodore Roosevelt, for example, used an outdoorsman reputation and his
military service to bolster his public persona, despite hailing from the often-ridiculed academic
class. In Roosevelt, academics not only find hope for acceptance and success in American
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politics but also a distinct message about the gender-soaked criticisms they face. Hofstadter calls
specifically on a quote from Roosevelt’s speech to an audience of Harvard students in which he
urged the young men not to “let those who stand for evil have all the virile qualities.”46 While we
should take issue with the assumed binary and the rigid ideas about gender that this quote points
to, the larger message is an important one: academics often falter in American culture because
they fail to be well-rounded and popularly accessible. Whether it is neglecting the ‘masculine’
qualities that make one relatable and sociable or ignoring important components of Alexander’s
holistic conception of spirituality, academics must strive to avoid falling into narrow stereotypes.
As Hofstadter transitions into his discussion of the early twentieth century, the
beginnings of the Progressive era introduce an important pattern of reform. Most prominently
revealed by “the Wisconsin Idea” near the beginning of the century, this pattern of progressive
reform starts with a demand for change that is quickly followed by a coupling of experts with the
ideas they present. In time, however, those who are upset with the costs of the reforms begin to
attack the experts responsible for the various programs, leading to a change in power, though this
change does not often lead to the elimination of the reform policies themselves.47 While these
patterns might be interesting to political scientists and theorists, they also present key insight into
how intellectuals are often regarded by American society. They rise during times of crisis, living
and dying by their association with the solutions they present. When they are pushed back into
down spells, however, the ideas they have spearheaded often do not receive the same
chastisement that their creators do. This attitude, no doubt, applies to intellect as much as it does
to intellectuals. We view it as more of a temporary or useful tool than a fundamental component
of our lives as well-rounded people. It is an instrument to be had rather than a quality to embrace.
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Our challenge, then, is figuring out how to restore intellect as a central component of
American identity, how to move it from a detached object to an intimate essential. Doing so, as
Hofstadter demonstrates, requires us to grapple with our history of inaccessible educational
institutions, our longstanding love for intuition and custom, and the narrow, gendered reputation
that intellect has carried for many years. Such a process will be slow, arduous, and require a
patient dive into the intricacies of everyday American life. The potential benefits, however, are
numerous and wonderful. Not only does the process itself involve a great deal of focused respect
for our neighbors and our history, but its results promise to make good on the American promise
of a marketplace of ideas, an equalized space of public discourse where we can collectively share
and struggle with the pain and beauty of human life. If American intellect has been an exclusive
luxury, this new understanding offers to spill out the contents for all to enjoy, leaning on their
autonomy and equality as true democratic republicans.

An Irony of Confidence
With history as our guide, we can begin to understand the whole of the American
intellectual life that we are hoping to change. American intellect is flawed, as Hofstadter shows,
because we view it as instrumental, exclusive, and antagonistic to intuition. This being the case,
Jacques Rancière’s proposed alternative must seek to be essential, inclusive, and intuitive. The
next chapter will explore these ideas in greater detail, but before wading into those particulars we
should think for a few moments about why this alternative is necessary in the first place. The
source of our urgency here is the ironic nature of American confidence. Remember that a key
moment in Hofstadter’s analysis of our history was the rise of populist movements that placed
great authority in the hands of intuition. Those trends run back at least as far as the eighteenth
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century in this country and have led to an ingrained love for the instinctual. You might even hear
Americans cite this as one of the crowning achievements of our democratic republic: the barrier
to influencing our institutions is, in theory, incredibly low. Intuition, if we choose, can hold equal
power to reason and intellect. In many respects, this is a boon for us. It allows us to be more in
touch with our emotions and provides fuller access to institutions. The danger, however, is that it
can also be used as an excuse to neglect our intellectual development.
In an era where the speed of life pushes us to take a lot for granted, Rancière makes a
careful distinction between two easily confused ideas about intellect. As he tells it, equality of
intellect is always present as capacity, but the fulfillment of that capacity is neither reliably
inevitable nor capable of ever being so. In other words, we can take for granted our equal
capacity, but not our equal achievement. By immortalizing the power of intuition, however, we
have started to take our equal achievement for granted. Part of the beauty of Rancière’s ideas
about equality, liberty, and truth is that they are processes. They can never exist unless we
actively bring them to fruition in a given situation, constructing them through our interactions
with each other. Claudia Ruitenberg argues that Rancière defines democracy itself as a process,
as it is “never in place, but always enters”. This idea that democracy and other qualities must
enter demands that we continuously work to see those qualities embodied in our actions.48
Equality, taken as a static principle, only requires stating our beliefs and making a passing effort
to structure institutions around those beliefs. It fosters faulty confidence in the permanence of
our equal achievement.
Equality as a process, in contrast, brings those ideas into action. They are never fulfilled
once and for all. They must always exist in moments and actions. This understanding of our
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ideals, as mentioned, places on us a demand for hard work and intentionality. It also suggests
that these ideals cannot be adequately captured in written or institutionalized form. This echoes
Socrates’s often cited reason for never writing his ideas down and places a similar call to action
on us. A society, being built on the need to distinguish people for role assignment and the need to
hold certain steady principles, cannot host truth, equality, or freedom in these living forms.
Ruitenberg notes that Rancière operates from a belief that membership in a society is “based on
assumptions of inequality.”49 That assumption is a necessary step in determining hierarchical
roles within a society. Therefore, a thriving vision of equality and democracy cannot belong to
the society itself. Rather, dynamic principles are the sole property of each human person, as
Jefferson argued the procurement of liberty is.50 To say otherwise, Jefferson and Rancière argue,
would wrest a great deal of power from each of us and would betray our republican ideals.
Surrendering ownership of our principles to a government would leave us wholly reliant
on society in a way that would cripple us, especially considering the modern manifestations of
human government. This surrender was precisely what Jefferson feared when he pushed for a
continued “revolutionary spirit.” It is a sign, in many respects, of a lack of confidence in our
abilities. Among Jefferson’s greatest concerns was the possibility that we would gradually lose
sight of our individual and influential role in shaping governance, either because of neglect or
insecurity. Our abandonment of personal response-ability, he worried, willingly submits us to the
possibility of an oppressive community structure.51 Here, I say ‘response-ability’ to emphasize
that we often fail to have confidence in our ability to respond. Responsibility has become

Ruitenberg, “What if Democracy Really Matters?” 2008, p. 4.
Rancière, 1991, p. 102. Jefferson, “79. A Bill for the More General,” 1951, p. 527.
51
Dotts, 2015, p. 3.
49
50

38
synonymous with obligations, and while we have fallen short on that front too, our lack of
perceived response-ability receives far less attention.
Hannah Arendt, speaking more generally to the human condition, argues something very
similar. A particular danger exists in democracy, she suggests while writing about the qualities of
totalitarian movements. This danger is the underappreciated anguish of a voiceless democratic
citizen. After observing the rise of Nazism and other totalitarian efforts, she notes how they
expose the tendency of modern democracies to be satisfied with both a minority rule and the
“silent approbation and tolerance of the indifferent and inarticulate sections of the people.”52 The
discourse may scream that a state is a democracy even as our lived experiences show otherwise.
The resulting dissonance, she later argues, contributes to the development of a loneliness that can
be devastating and make people vulnerable to the trappings of ideology and totalitarian fear. The
fundamental danger of these ideologies is not that they build bad convictions, but that they
“destroy the capacity to form any” convictions with any real confidence or authority.53 Ideology
then becomes the natural enemy of the form of intellect we are trying to build, as it shatters the
confidence of people in their ability to engage with intellectual processes.
Despite the well-documented concerns of Arendt and others, however, American cultural
tendencies have continued to trend towards loneliness and ideological vulnerability. Americans,
by and large no longer think themselves capable of their self-governance, even as they exude
self-confidence and bluster about their excellence. The moment a national, or even local, crisis
arises in any facet of our lives, the knee-jerk response is to demand action from our government.
Rarely, if ever, do the majority of Americans place demands on themselves or take ownership of
solving the issue. We have lost that fundamental American faith in our ability to ‘meet the
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moment.’ The same can be said for slower attempts to bring about change and improvement.
Though there are exceptions, to be American generally means subscribing to a belief in our
elected governing body as our saving grace. Even those who look beyond government for change
still operate under the assumption that such efforts are exceptional in some way. We laud their
efforts because it seems somehow remarkable that a ‘common’ citizen could make an impact
without going through their government. This dependence on our government would not be
inherently harmful except that our predominant view of that government rests power
overwhelmingly in the hands of politicians, either in Washington D.C. or our state’s capital, who
have increasingly preyed on our loneliness, our ideological vulnerabilities, and our lack of
confidence in all corners of the political spectrum.
In this process of becoming more dependent, our prevailing notion of citizenship in
America has become a stagnant one: ‘if I stay informed and vote each cycle, I have done my
civic duty.’ Outside of a singular event of political action, the archetypical American relies
entirely on elected representatives to do the work of maintaining our democratic republic. We
have fallen far from Jefferson’s vision for us and increasingly close to Arendt’s totalitarian
warnings. Jefferson yearned for a republic where every person could view themself as “a
participator in the government of affairs not merely at an election, one day in the year, but every
day.”54 Speaking in a time of very exclusive white-male citizenship, he writes of a passion in
which a person would “let the heart be torn out of his body sooner than his power be wrested
from him by a Caesar or a Bonaparte.”55 The serious and important omissions from his definition
of citizenship aside, it is hard to find that ferocious passion and confidence among us today. The
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ground does not shake with our collective, momentous action like Jefferson recalls in
Revolutionary New England.56 We scarcely even recognize our vital role in preserving
democratic and republican principles, let alone that we are “the ultimate line of defense” against
tyranny.57 Suzanna Sherry notes this phenomenon as she laments that “everyone now has rights,
but no one has responsibilities.”58 I would take her already bold claim a step further: no one even
wants responsibilities, at least in the civic realm. Why have we fallen into such dispassion?
Rancière would posit, and Jefferson would likely agree, that we have lost sight of our responseability, our capacity to affect change and, therefore, have no reason to strive for passionate
action. Despite being one of the more brazen actors on the international stage, the American
people generally have a self-efficacy problem.
Recognizing our schools as both a cause and consequence of this tendency away from
passion, it becomes obvious in any given civics-education classroom. The idea of ‘American
equality’ that we learn is a God-given or naturally endowed state of being, assumed absolutely
and requiring no further maintenance if we hope to enjoy it. ‘American freedom’ is etched in
parchment and tucked away in our nation’s capital, only invoked and wheeled out when its limits
are in question. ‘American truth,’ especially in our schools, is absolute, digestible, and
reproducible in recognizable forms. Widely accepted criticism of standardized testing, by
educators and politicians of both ideological stripes, points to our tendency to fixate on concepts
that can be measured, broken down into sections, and routinely covered in classrooms. This is
not to say our existence contains no absolute, digestible, and reproducible truths, but rather to
point out that stale absolutism is the unmistakable quality of modern American education. Some
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exceptions exist, but by and large the ideas laid out above are identifiable and dominant
narratives in our country. Together they paint and frame a distinct way of life and manner of
discourse that is said to represent the American democratic republic. In actuality, however, it
falls far short of that mark.
Having discussed, in the first section of this chapter, the new understandings of liberty
and equality that Rancière brings forth, the final element serves to connect all of these endeavors
within education. This element, truth, though desirable in absolute form, becomes much more
useful in active and discursive forms. A conception of absolute truth allows for unequal
intellectual capacity because it leaves room for the assumption that some of us hold
understandings that other people may never be able to reach, which immediately sets the stage
for exploitation and hierarchy. It does not require this assumption, but it does permit it.
Discursive truth, in contrast, finds no room for it. To engage with truth in discussion, the two
parties must have equal capacity for understanding and must be free to make use of those
capacities. We enter a discussion, centered around our working truths and interpretations, as
liberated equals. Absolute truth, therefore, hardly lends itself to this discourse, especially when
one side is professed to be absolutely incorrect. On the other hand, discursive truth, as it helps to
facilitate communication, does not rule out the absolute. James and Rancière see the two as
compatible, with working truths laying within our reach and the absolute form of truth existing
beyond our comprehension but existing just the same.59 This understanding of truth, I will argue,
only offends those who consider themselves infallible, and, in doing so, presume to be divine. A
democratic republic, as a form of government reliant on our ability to converse about issues from
diverse perspectives and to draw information from other parties, draws infinitely greater
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strengths from those forms of truth which lend themselves to debate and exchange than from
those that end discussion promptly and swiftly.
None of this is to condemn the dominant American narratives on intelligence, truth,
freedom, and equality, but simply to show that they are insufficient for fully realizing our ideal
democratic republic. Rancière doubts altogether the tangibility of this ideal but, even still,
recognizes that a dynamic understanding of equality, freedom, and truth provides our best chance
at reaching it. Their stale and stagnant counterparts, inked in the foundations of American society
and trusted to hold us up, will inevitably fail us so long as we place them in that role. These lofty
human ideals long to come out and dance between the abstract and the practical, like James’s
metaphor of the fish moving between concrete water and abstract air.60 Allowing them to do so,
however, is a process that requires each of us to energetically believe in our capacities and see
them to fruition. It requires us to build and sustain a confidence in our response-abilities and our
intellectual capacities. There are no shortcuts on the road to democracy or to republicanism.
They are won through a daily, relentless, hard-fought defense of their ideals and components.
Rancière and James beg us to wake from our collective slumber, our impatient waiting for
institution-led deliverance, and to accept the work laid before us by our founders. As we will see
ahead, they challenge us with a new vision of intellect, one that aims to be essential, inclusive,
and intuitive, working towards the ultimate goal of fulfilling the democratic republican promise.
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Chapter 2: Finding Intellectual Access
As the last chapter showed, discussing terms like intellect, particularly in the context of
American life, pushes us to recognize that these issues are far from one-dimensional. Even an
idea as seemingly simple as knowledge, which serves as part of the foundation for intellect, can
take on several forms. Twentieth-century American philosopher William James, in his lecture
series entitled Pragmatism, argues that we can have knowledge in roughly two spheres of our
ever-complicated lives: the abstract and the concrete. Similar to theory and practice, these
broader terms can also correspond to principles and events, respectively. As humans living in
physical bodies, we exist in the concrete world but, at the same time, remain captivated by the
abstract and take meaning from it. James argues that the realm of the abstract, despite our typical
sense of the word, originates in and depends on its relationship to the concrete. No person has
ever sat around imagining what a dog might be like and then gone out to look for specific
instances to compare to that concept. Instead, we see dogs and use those concrete instances to
fuel our understanding of what it means that something is a dog. Our process of creating
abstraction, in other words, is motivated by our concrete needs and fueled by our concrete
observations. James imagines us as fish, swimming in the water of our day-to-day but drawing
vibrantly from the atmosphere above the surface.61
This ‘pragmatic’ method of pulling pockets of abstract atmosphere down into the
concrete water helps create a richer relationship between the two. Without this process of close
connection, the concrete and abstract would only interact at the point where we distinguish them:
the surface. By breaching this distinction and stretching the ways they interact, we can unlock a
new level of practical and abstracting power in ourselves. Throughout his lectures, James paints
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stunning portraits of truth and knowledge, two terms that are instrumental in any vision of
intellect. He takes a special interest in how opposing ideas, such as free will and determinism,
can be constructive through the tensions they create.62
Across the Atlantic Ocean, the French-Algerian philosopher Jacques Rancière, in his
work The Ignorant Schoolmaster, reaches back to the work of Joseph Jacotot to promote an
equally stunning vision of intellect, marked by radical equality. He argues that distinction, within
the concept of intellect, is a destructive force rather than an enlightening one. When you
distinguish free will and determinism from each other, to use James’s example, you create the
possibility that one perspective might take and exploit a superior position to the other. Instead,
Rancière might prefer having the two terms work in concert under an umbrella of ‘complex
agency.’ Following this example, we are better served to view intellect as a unified force, a force
that is available to all of us without distinction, even if it manifests in several different ways. We
can see clear differences, he argues, in how we achieve intellect, but not in our capabilities.63 For
Rancière, this view of intellect relies on the new understandings of liberty and equality alluded to
earlier. His dogged support of human equality and ultimate directive to fight for that ideal in the
thick of inherently unequal institutions both borrows from and complements James’s potent
pragmatic attitude and accessible conception of truth.
Having established that intellect and its opponents have played an important part in
American history and governance, Rancière’s critique of Western attitudes becomes especially
useful. In place of the limiting, exclusive, and lifeless intellectual life that has come to define
American culture, Rancière and James offer up a lively alternative, one that is deeply tied to a
more sustainable and effective education for democratic republican citizenship. This vision,
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revolving around a fundamental assumption of intellectual access, offloads both the obligations
and influences of teachers. Instead, it places both responsibility and response-ability in the hands
of students, as burgeoning democratic republican citizens. In doing so, Rancière and James
create an understanding of intellect that holds three important qualities. It is essential, it is
inclusive, and it is intuitive.

“All People Think;” It’s Essential
The two philosophers begin by recognizing the same fact: all people think. For James,
this means that all people possess and maintain an attitude toward the universe and its content.64
In other words, all people ponder their surroundings. Our attitudes include both the emotional
components of our dispositions and the philosophical qualities of our unique worldview. James’s
claim here provides a simple but striking reminder that each of us has a personal philosophy
about life and that we are bound together by that fact. Rancière recognizes our unique attitudes
as well. He notices their existence most clearly when he focuses on our equally shared human
capacities for reflection and articulation.65 We are all, he argues, capable of both turning our
thoughts inward and expressing our opinions outward. He compares the combination of these
actions to poetic translation of our experiences. Borrowing Descartes’s famous phrase, he argues
that we think because we are. Instead of Descartes’s assertion that our ability to think,
specifically to doubt, proves our existence, Rancière argues that our existence as humans
guarantees that we are thinking beings.66 To be human is to think and reflect and dream even if
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those processes might look different for different people. Thought is an essential aspect of our
lives as humans, and it follows, James and Rancière argue, that intellect is as well.
Having built up this assumption that all people are thinking people, James moves to
define the components of our individual philosophies. He starts by arguing that we all take
interest in and try to balance abstract and concrete ideas in our pursuits of truth.67 James’s
background as a psychologist, as recounted by Jack Barbalet, sheds some light on this innate
human interest. His psychological theory of experience argued that “percepts are ontologically
and epistemologically prior to concepts.”68 Put another way, he argues that our observations
precede the principles we pull from them. This creates a firm interest in both what we perceive
and what we abstract from those perceptions. More than that, James argues that all knowledge
originates in the concrete. We are interested in the rain as we experience it in a given storm and
as we can draw conclusions about the general makeup and consequences of rain, but our concrete
interest in a particular storm must come first. If nothing that we think about originates in our
brain, then we can always trace our ideas back to some concrete observation of the physical
world or some other part of our sensory reality. This seems obvious, but we are often tempted to
believe the opposite: that the abstract things we hold in our heads lead us to explore the concrete.
James acknowledges that this directional action might be true in isolation. There are instances
where our thoughts lead us to move into the concrete world, like when we are searching for a
place to eat lunch. If we step back, however, we will always find a concrete concern that
preceded that ‘initial’ abstraction, like the hunger that pushes us to search for food.69
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Rancière might take James’s commentary about the abstract and the concrete as a
distinguishing act, dividing us into two camps: rationalists and empiricists. James, using those
terms in his work, acknowledges that schools of philosophy have often been split along these
lines. Rationalists take pleasure in the purest principles they can generalize from gritty realities,
while empiricists find beauty in the grittiness itself, in its various and useful forms. However, if
we are true to ourselves, James confesses, we do not find either of these extreme approaches
satisfying. The rational approach asks us to disconnect from the world we occupy in a way that
resembles Plato’s actor in the “Allegory of the Cave.” A rationalist will too often draw their
ideas from the “muddy particulars” of life only to turn around and demean those “muddy”
origins,70 similar to how Plato’s actor looks down on the life inside the cave once freed from it.
The empirical approach, in contrast, looks at each passing moment with fresh,
unprejudiced eyes. It resembles a fearless and curious child-like state. This may sound
spectacular, but it comes at a cost. Without the ability to draw and sustain generalized
conclusions and to recognize patterns, we lose both our sense of stability and the larger context
of our living. We might be left, in this case, to resort to blindly wandering from moment to
moment. Because of the flaws in both approaches, James argues that we crave something
between the haughty abstract and the brutish empirical extremes. That middle ground is essential
for our lives as well-rounded people and can be found through James’s intellectual pragmatism.
This introductory stance lays out the pattern that James follows throughout the rest of his
lectures, one which is also recognizable in the works of his peer John Dewey: the process of
reframing a stagnant dichotomy as a fruitful tension. Let us linger on that for a second longer.
This approach echoes James’s later description of the pragmatic method, which aims to focus on
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the practical implications of ideas rather than a cross-section of their qualities within a particular
moment,71 but it does much more for us in an American context.
A large portion of American discourse is unmistakably defined by the process of
searching for sides and dichotomies in an argument. Feeding on our innate human tribal
tendencies, we are often driven to find like minds and kindred souls we can fight alongside. We
saw and will see this pattern repeatedly in Hofstadter’s account of our historical priorities and
attitudes. Wherever an issue meriting discussion exists within our country, we have become
adept at identifying the two distinct poles surrounding that issue. These poles dominate our news
cycle, frame our approach to problem-solving, and provide us with political identities. Often lost
between the poles, though not lost on many people, is an entire spectrum of nuance. We
recognize the presence of alternative solutions, but the narrative of polarity is often effective in
pushing us to extremes. Our mutually exclusive two-party system is the standard-bearer of this
American polarity. Many people find both parties unsavory in some way and recognize the
possibility for compromise but are pressured into aligning with one of the flawed sides each
election cycle.
What James offers here is a chance to reframe our discourse in a way that gravitates
towards the empty space between the poles. The dominant American political narrative might be
comparable to two magnets with a field of pull between them and the objects of focus being the
magnets or the extremes themselves. In this case, it is not our intellect that serves a crucial role.
Intellect exists in the space between poles, in the world of nuance, complicated answers, and
collaboration. Instead, polarity draws on simple ideas and ideologies, those states of mind that
Arendt warns against and politicians feast on. James’s narrative, in contrast, more resembles a
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vehicle rounding a corner as it is pulled on in either direction by centripetal or centrifugal forces.
If the car, James’s object of focus, moved wholly towards either of the forces pulling on it, it
would veer off the road. If instead, the vehicle relies on both forces and the tension between
them, it can chart a course that gets it through the curve safely. This is not to say that our goal
should always be to meet in the middle on controversial issues. However, if we can reframe these
conversations and focus on the legitimate human concerns that underlie each side, instead of
their extreme ideas, we can and should always find room for compromise. We would not seek a
compromise that meets a potential shoplifter in the middle on their criminal plans, but we should
look to work with the human concerns motivating the desire to steal. Maintaining this course of
action requires that we prioritize our intellectual activities, even on a basic level. In particular,
James’s pragmatic method helps reframe our focus so that we can see the path between instead
of simply seeing the two extremes. In doing so, we not only have a better chance of finding a
true solution, but we also enter into a discourse that includes both extreme forces in a type of
competitive cooperation.
Where James establishes his pragmatic method in response to the phrase ‘all people
think,’ Rancière takes a different approach as he zeroes in on the first word: all. His inspiration,
Jacotot, was challenged to reconsider his entire approach to education when his Flemishspeaking students learned French under his nose without their instructor having even an ounce of
Flemish language experience. The students, left alone with French and Flemish copies of the
book Télémaque, were able to translate the French language and use elements of it without any
substantive help from their instructor. Instead of relying on the traditional teacher-student
dynamic, which Rancière calls ‘explication,’ these students embodied and stretched the idea that
all people think. They engaged with their intellectual abilities using a process, referred to in
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instructive form as “universal teaching,” that should be familiar to any parent. It is the same
process children use to learn their native language, grappling for meaning by piecing together
patterns within their immersive experiences.72 Repeated exposure to certain words and their
accompanying actions allows children to develop language skills through a gradual and
deliberate process, which Jacotot’s students emulated. If these students could make great strides
towards learning French through their natural learning processes and a simple text, Jacotot
wondered what obstacles prevent this process under normal conditions.

Inclusivity Through Equality and Truth
Jacotot and Rancière trace this obstruction of students’ natural learning processes back to
the traditional teacher-student relationship, one that they consider to be fundamentally unequal.
Teachers, regarded as people with superior intellect, engage in a constant practice of creating and
filling an “abyss of ignorance” within their student’s knowledge.73 The exercise of education, in
this model, relies on showing the student the gap in their knowledge and then filling it, but never
showing the student that they can fill it in on their own. It is almost like a form of charity or the
old adage of giving someone a fish without teaching them how to fish. It is, in other words,
exclusive in the most basic manner. To some extent, this is understandable, because if students
learned that they were capable of bridging these gaps on their own, the authority of their teachers
might suddenly become baseless and arbitrary. It is hard to think of anything more threatening to
modern teachers and schools than a loss of authority, so they often work to maintain the
hierarchical structure. Yes, students might one day rise to the intellectual level of their teacher,
but not so long as they hold the title of ‘student.’ Two people may even have equal access to
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intellect, as Rancière later claims, but if one person is designated as the teacher of the other,
somehow the two are no longer equals. This form of teaching requires us to hold onto the
assumption that the student has inferior capacities, otherwise it is hard to justify the stepwise
explanation and handholding. People usually avoid overzealous support and explanation when
we are with our intellectual equals.
This analysis of an oppressive system, like that which Rancière provides, welcomes
comparison to the works of Paulo Freire, especially his argument in The Pedagogy of the
Oppressed. While establishing the problems of modern society, Freire and Rancière key in on the
same issue: a hierarchical and oppressive social structure. This structure strips both the ‘higher’
and ‘lower’ classes of their humanity and holds the ‘lower’ class entirely out of the realm of
influence.74 One can see these problems magnified, in an American context, within the welldocumented presence of staggering economic inequality and class divisions, though they
certainly exist elsewhere too. These issues are recognizable to all of us regardless of how we
think we should respond to them. For both Freire and Rancière, the exclusion created by these
power dynamics is the most troubling part.
By trying to will a more inclusive and open system into existence, Freire and Rancière
both present a bold and dynamic vision for the ‘lower’ class as they work to overcome these
structures, one that centers on processes of reflection and action, which Freire calls “praxis.”75 It
is through working to realize our own humanity and recovering our “ontological” efforts that the
subjugated classes can develop a more humanizing form of government.76 In the process of
laying out this reclamation of humanness, Freire uses vivid vocabulary and understanding of
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human complexities that add richness and character to this, already radical, perspective on
communal living. For example, his differentiation between “occupation” as a form of work and
“preoccupation” as work with a reflective component is intensely useful when thinking about our
relation to labor.77 Freire also holds up the term “educational projects” to refer to efforts, like
Rancière’s, which occur outside the formal schooling system.78 Between praxis, occupation,
preoccupation, and educational projects, he expands the ways we can think and talk about these
issues above and beyond the plain language Rancière often defaults to.
Freire and Rancière do not agree in all parts of their arguments, however. The most
significant difference between Freire’s and Rancière work is the tendency for Freire to push for
structural change, while Rancière turns away from structural concerns. Because of this,
Rancière’s work fits more comfortably into the framework of a democratic republic. A close
look shows Rancière’s ideas leaning much closer to Jefferson’s republicanism than Freire’s do.
For Freire, hope lies in our ability to overturn oppressive systems and replace them with better
institutions, evident in his use of the phrase “new regime.”79 His solutions exist more within the
framework of institutional turnover, where one system is called on to replace another, much like
the American Revolution. Rancière, on the other hand, is more cynical and rests his hope in our
ability to create and sustain change outside of the system, claiming that systems themselves
always breed inequality.
Todd May further extends this when he claims that Rancière’s argument about equality
“allows us to think [of] anarchism in a positive fashion” without going so far as to set up a
structure like Marxism.80 Far from our typical picture of anarchy, Rancière’s ideas do borrow
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from the same cynicism toward institutions and faith in people that anarchism often implies. In
this sense, his approach is more sympathetic to the less extreme republican ideal that power
should rest in the hands of the people, instead of the government itself. While Freire’s
institutional turnover looks to re-humanize everyone in the society, it makes no promises for a
democratic republic as the new structure. Rancière, even though he rejects all structures, seeks
out a radical form of democratic republican government by advocating for a complete focus on
giving power to the citizens and expanding the inclusivity of our foundational concepts. Because
they share the same theoretical basis and concerns, however, Freire’s beautiful language and
complex understanding of the condition of the oppressed can help clarify and strengthen our
understanding of the arguments Rancière lays out.
This shared argument starts with the idea that inequality is established early in our lives
and permeates the actions and interactions that compose our society. Education is not the sole
executor of this oppression. Exclusion is an integral part of our social order from early in our
lives. Students raised under this belief in superior and inferior intellects are bound to go on to
create a larger world that recognizes the same superiority. Even while they are students, they
often look at those behind them in school as their inferiors.81 This is often the first in a pervasive
pattern of hierarchical perception that pits young against old, ‘blue-collar’ workers against
‘white-collar’ workers, and countless other groups against each other, all jockeying for the
superior position. When we enter a situation as people and engage with our natural learning
processes, however, we can all find equal access to the world of intellect. It is only when this
innate learning method is pulled out of its natural form, divided, and sorted into neat categories
that we see differences emerge.
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If we take our inherent thoughtfulness, then, and combine it with this renewed
recognition of our natural learning processes, Rancière finds solid ground for the democratic
hypothesis that all people have equal ability to access intellect. Put differently, if we all think and
can make progress towards our intellectual potential by using our thoughts, then our capacities
for improved intellect would logically be equivalent. The main tool for convincing us otherwise,
in Rancière’s eyes, is the term ‘difference’.82 Claims about differences often combine with our
desire to compare various worth to quickly turn a distinction into a statement of hierarchy. Even
the simplest acknowledgement of difference provides the proponents of explication with
“enough to exalt all the thrones of the hierarchy of intellect,” as the human tendency to turn
difference into inequality takes over.83 These thrones, which place limits on intellectual
accessibility, are deeply unsatisfying for Rancière and push him to commit wholeheartedly to the
democratic principle of equal potential.
Distinct differences do indeed exist in some people, including developmental, expressive,
receptive, and intellectual disabilities. None of these, however, justify refusing to recognize their
ability to access intellect, for two reasons. The first draws support from the ‘social model of
disability’ prevalent in the discourse of multiple fields, such as psychology and sociology.
Broadly understood, this model argues that the disabling force in a person’s life is not their
impairments, but the social forces that assume impairments create inferiority.84 People do not
‘have’ disabilities but rather are disabled by the societal belief that their differences make them
inferior in some way. It is almost like a self-fulfilling prophecy that a society forces onto a
person through a given cultural belief. As a model, this approach to disability stands on equal
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ground with the current approach, often called the medical model, which is also scientifically
developed. For this reason, we can very easily justify shifting our beliefs to align with the social
model, since it carries as much proof and scientific weight as the beliefs we currently hold.
Accepting this perspective, there is no inconsistency in extending assumptions of intellectual
accessibility to all people, since any perceived and substantial differences are not innate, but
rather found in society. The language of ‘model’ is also helpful for understanding what Rancière
is trying to accomplish here with intellect. He is not looking for some empirical fact about
intellect, but rather developing a model or approach to thinking about intellect.
That said, the second reason we should, without hesitation, include disabled people
among the ranks of humans with intellectual access comes from a similar idea. This idea is the
justifiable assumption that our understanding of intellect is incomplete. Humans have worked for
generations to develop a firm definition of intellect and to measure it in precise ways, but we are
far from completing that definition. If we assume that the human brain is both limited in its range
of comprehension and imperfect in its ability to grasp the whole scope of wisdom, we should
know that we will never have a full and absolute picture of intellect. With possible discoveries
about human intellect always on the horizon, it is fruitless to make definitive and restrictive
statements about someone’s ability to access intellect. In the absence of any tangible and
recognizable proof, what reason do we have for differentiating between our intellectual
capacities and those of disabled people? It seems fair to say that the benefits of Rancière’s
principle of equality should be extended equally to all human beings, without exceptions being
drawn from our provisional claims about the differences between us.
James is not as fervent as Rancière in his support of this equality, but his continued
development of pragmatics does offer glimpses of universally accessible modes of thinking that
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pave the way for inclusive visions of intellect. Any approach to truth-seeking carries a view of
truth within it, and James’s definition of truth bears a striking resemblance to Rancière’s
universal teaching and learning. Truth takes on its meaning, he claims, when “we can assimilate,
validate, corroborate, and verify” it.85 In practice, this works a lot like the scientific method. A
static truth is as useless to a pragmatist as it is to a scientist. We must be able to meet two
requirements in our truth-seeking: (1) matching up our truth candidates with a verifiable
“sensible terminus” and (2) reconciling them with our existing body of truth.86 Scientists meet
similar criteria when they provide detailed accounts of their findings and situate their
conclusions within the existing scientific literature. We would probably suspect that a scientist
who omitted part of their data was manipulating their results, and we would call that same
scientist foolish if they looked to overturn a prevailing belief based on the results of a singular
study. Left unchecked, those practices would unravel the reliability and credibility of scientific
study.
Similarly, the new truths we find in our truth-seeking efforts “must derange common
sense and previous belief as little as possible,” otherwise they threaten the integrity of our
concept of truth.87 Conservatism and stability are valuable precisely because they provide an
anchor, a tether that keeps us from drifting aimlessly through different iterations of truth. When
we allow a new truth to disturb this stability, beyond a certain point, we also lose the
predictability and reliability that make our truths meaningful. In addition to this need for
verification and reconciliation, our truths must ‘work’ for us in achieving some end beyond
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themselves, often achievement of our basic needs.88 They become dynamic both by continually
fulfilling the burden of proof and by being useful.
For Rancière, our natural learning process could not be more accessible and
straightforward. It is a simple exercise of “comparing two facts,” verifying one using the other.89
In the case of Jacotot’s students, the two facts were: first, the words of the first sentence of
Tèlèmaque, and second, that those ideas were written on the page.90 With knowledge of the
content of the first sentence and of its location in the French text, students could begin the
process of comparing facts. They might naturally begin by comparing the word ‘Calypso’ to the
first word written on the page. From there they could proceed through the rest of the text, using
processes of induction and deduction, creating abstractions and applying them to decipher the
grammatical construction and to find the parallel words between the two translations. James
argues that we find truths in much the same way: by comparing the fledgling truth with our
existing truths. It is a process of trial-and-error reminiscent of our curious younger selves or the
ridiculed but effective ‘guess-and-check’ method in mathematics. In this moment, the two
philosophers come together to create a vision of natural learning as an active process of making
truths through verification.91 James comes to this idea with a focus on the process itself, while
Rancière emphasizes our equal ability to make use of it. One lays the simple but awe-inducing
mechanical foundation, while the other dreams up grandiose structures to lay on top of it.
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Intuition and The Power of ‘Calypso’
The assumed importance of discourse and language in human life drives both James’s
and Rancière’s ‘truth-making’ processes. We are thinking beings, but our “thought must be
spoken, manifested in works, communicated to other thinking beings.”92 The expression of our
ideas is as important as verifying them because without moving our thoughts beyond our heads,
through some form of communication or action, the concept of thought barely has meaning. The
intuitive and the practical functions of communication are important partners of our intellectual
processes. It is not the mechanics of that communication, however, that make a difference here.
Discussing Jacotot’s arguments about languages, Rancière summarizes a belief that “all
languages [are] equally arbitrary.”93 James argues something similar, saying that our names for
various concepts are meaningless.94 This idea that our language is arbitrary is logical and
inoffensive to most people, but Rancière reminds us that it does not sit well with others,
especially those who value our historical customs and view the concept of randomness as an
attack on those customs. He is quick to suggest that “only the lazy are afraid of the idea of
arbitrariness,” but this rebuke of ‘the lazy’ goes a step too far.95 The fear that arbitrariness leads
to relativism and confusion is both genuine and valuable. Yes, operating in an arbitrary realm
does demand a good deal of work from us, but that does not automatically mean that everyone
who opposes arbitrariness does it out of laziness. Here, Rancière mistakenly conflates an
aversion to work and an aversion to subjectivity. Some people, guided by their justifiable fears,
are just cautious of a tendency to slip away from tradition and values, and those considerations
should be both present and validated in any discussion of arbitrariness.
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That the words we form and the ways we combine them are arbitrary, however, does not
take away from the influence that the more general concept of language and expression carries. It
would be a mistake to think that the arbitrary nature of individual languages means that we
should not have expressive communication. In fact, we would be hard-pressed to imagine a
world where we were unable to converse with one another. Such a life would be isolating and
lonesome. Even setting the solitude of a language-less world aside, there is another issue with a
world devoid of communicative interaction. Rancière proposes that “there is only one power,
that of saying and speaking.”96 Lacking the ability to speak—or, in the broader sense, to
communicate—with one another leaves us powerless and frustrated. On an even deeper level, the
loss of the ability to express our thoughts takes away a fundamental part of our humanity. It
denies us the chance to engage with ourselves, our world, and other people in meaningful ways,
one of the core activities of human existence and a primary tool for meeting some of our basic
needs.
Rancière’s claim here is built on a well-regarded, though contestable, assumption that
humans are both social and political animals, using political in the broadest sense. He views our
social needs, described as “the desire to understand and to be understood,” as the single driving
force in all of our ‘truth-making’ efforts.97 We get this chance to understand others and to have
our own experiences validated through social activities and communication. For this analysis, I
consider Rancière and James’s socially inclined human to be a reasonable and agreeable theory.
Therefore, I agree that discourse plays a crucial role in human existence. In part, this becomes
crucial because it opens up important room for our intuitive and expressive selves to enter the
equation. Up until this point in the discussion, our understanding of intellect has been essential
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and inclusive but has not made room for those parts of our lives that are not fully rational. It is
true that Rancière’s proposed intellect will never have time for expressed ideas that are not
logically verifiable, but the central role of language in his approach opens the door for
connections with the non-rational that will become important for our later discussion of the
spiritual components of human life.
Through this discussion of language, specifically the language within Tèlèmaque,
Rancière lays the groundwork for his revisions to our theory of intellect. The grandiose statement
he borrows from Jacotot claims that “everything is in everything.”98 We can understand this
either as a broad statement about the potential in objects to teach us about the world or as a
targeted statement literally telling us that the entirety of human intellectual potential exists in the
word ‘everything’ itself. More in line with the second interpretation, Rancière presents Jacotot’s
belief that “the power of intellect that is in any human manifestation” can be found in the word
‘Calypso’.99 In other words, a single word can show us the full picture of our human potential to
access intellect. The same intellectual qualities that write magnificent opuses and make lifealtering scientific discoveries are present when we engage with the word ‘Calypso.’ In this case,
‘Calypso’ is a stand-in for any word or human communication. The content matters much less
than the processes that act on that content.
The effects of these claims are twofold. First, the idea that everything is contained in
everything else simultaneously expands and shrinks our understanding of what ‘everything’
means. Everything now includes the innate complexity of even the most mundane objects, which
we often take for granted. At the same time, however, we can see the entirety of everything
represented in this finite object as well. To take Rancière’s, slightly less abstract, example of
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intellect, this approach tells us that we can find the totality of human intellect in one small object
of human intellect, like the word ‘Calypso.’ Thinking like this can inject immense possibility
into the smallest fragment of our intellectual history, even while it appears to reduce that history
to a simple process.
That process, the second effect of Rancière’s claim, is built on the assumption that
speaking about the ‘truth’ is impossible.100 This is the same contention James makes: that
absolute truth lies beyond the reach of our imperfect human minds.101 The impossibility of
grasping truth, then, redefines our process of articulation. Instead of something that says the
truth, our conversation “translates” our lived experiences and “invites others to do the same.”102
In this view, we cannot comprehend or express the pure image in front of us, but instead of
letting that discourage us, we opt for the closest approximation we can manage: our translations
of that reality. “Everything is in everything” because all of our great works are equally distant
from the true nature of what we are trying to describe.103 These two effects, the expanded power
of a word and the redefinition of communication processes, craft a remarkable conception of
language and grant that conception a vital role in human existence, both intellectually and, as we
will see, spiritually.
That prominent new role Rancière and James assign to language, as the facilitator of all
human thoughts, solidifies it as the medium for any human cognition or communication. We see
this especially as James argues both that “all human thinking gets discursified” and that “all truth
thus gets verbally built out” for our equal access.104 An active and social view of truth means that
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our discourse facilitates the process of our thoughts and subsequent construction of truth. In this
vision, our languages become much more than accessories to our thoughts and experiences.
Though they remain tools, their presence in our lives becomes indispensable. They not only help
us express and organize our lived experiences in repeatable ways, but they also provide the
essential link between ourselves and those around us. Language frees us from both James’s
isolation of disorganization and Arendt’s isolation of loneliness.
For James, language also makes it possible for us to verify truths that we cannot directly
locate with our immediate senses. As obvious as this may sound, systems of communication
provide a vital and underappreciated service when they let us develop and consistently apply
abstract concepts. Without the “consistency, stability, and flowing human intercourse” that
language provides us, we would only be left with those truths we could access through our
senses at a given time, those found in our current environment.105 Between this, and the powers
Rancière assigned to language, it is clear that language education serves a vital role in the revised
view of intellect he and James and offer.
Language was, no doubt, important to those who preceded both James and Rancière, but
arguably not to the same extent. The hardline rationalist and empiricist perspectives James
opposes each seem to miss a crucial element of the power communication can hold. Rationalists
miss out on the ability of language to tie itself to both practical action and subjective forms. They
can become arbitrarily preoccupied with certain forms of communication and miss out on the
need for the kinds of interaction that spur activity. They might also fully reject anything that does
not claim to be absolutely true, ignoring a large portion of human ideas in the process.
Empiricists, in contrast, miss the consistent and stabilizing elements of language that allow for
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cleaner exchange of ideas and for understandings to be built up over time.106 When this happens,
they might lose sight of their context and become both redundant and inefficient. By adopting
rationalism and empiricism together, under the heading of pragmatism, James hopes to offset the
weaknesses of both approaches and bring their strengths into harmony with one another.
Similarly, the explicative teachers Rancière opposes also rely on language in their
methods and do so in a variety of creative ways, but they neglect one of communication’s most
crucial roles. All explicative uses of language are aimed at sustaining the hierarchy that
explication depends on. Explicators might recognize a large portion of the beauty that language
has to offer the human spirit, but they will always miss one crucial component: the ability of
language to free us and recognize our autonomy. Because they are obsessed with the status quo,
in other words, they refuse to engage with the kinds of language that liberate people. The
liberating capacities of language are substantial in both form and influence, as we see through
any number of literary genres and notable works, but explication denies us the chance to utilize
those capacities.
It is true that Rancière does something similar when he ignores the hierarchical
capabilities of language, but he does this in a way that allows him to pull the benefits of those
capabilities—such as order and respect—without adopting their restrictive characteristics.
Because he finds alternative ways to achieve the same benefits, it is much less concerning that
Rancière limits the forms of language he is engaging with. With that exception stated, the type of
discourse James and Rancière set forth seeks to recognize all of the capacities found in the use of
language, including those of liberation, actionability, and stability, which other approaches
neglect. By bringing a larger share of our discursive power together, and redefining elements of
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it more fully, they allow us to come much closer to a complete understanding and use of that
power than we might have before.

Freeing Our Intellect
The existing beliefs Rancière seeks to challenge are built on a familiar circular argument
that argues superior people do better in areas of intellect because they are smarter. In different
words, he argues, this logic can be reduced to ‘they are smarter because they are smarter’. At a
basic level, this approach is incredibly exclusive. Rancière acknowledges that if, somehow, we
could measure intellect through looking at brain size, a pseudoscience that has been thoroughly
debunked, then we would have real evidence for intellectual superiority. However, this
superiority would be self-evident, like the difference between humans and animals. It would not
need to be reasserted or taught to us. Since we have not found intellectual distinctions with
definitive physical or scientific foundations, any superiority we claim to have must be based on
unprovable reasoning. You cannot prove something in the absence of physical evidence. You can
take it on faith, but you cannot prove it. Accordingly, because the foundation for traditional
practice is built on such unproven claims and circular logic, Rancière reasons he can and should
present an equally unproven claim or model for consideration. He argues that some people
produce poorer quality of work simply because they have worked more poorly.107 This is a key
consequence of his proposed vision of intellect, and it is one that binds itself tightly to a wellfunctioning democratic republic.
Stated differently, intellect is not an innate quality but is instead determined by our effort
levels. Recognizing our equality of intellect at birth and our subsequent intellectual
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differentiation as we progress in age, Rancière proposes that the differences are attributable to
the amount of successful work we apply in accessing our intellectual capacities. This focus on
effort instead of innate intellectual fitness presents a host of personal and societal implications
worth pursuing. The most immediate consequence is the increased emphasis on our agency and
work ethic in the pursuit of intellect. Though circumstances play a substantial role in our ability
to achieve, the effort that we apply is often the ultimate operative force in our successes. From
this model an entire field of possibilities begins to open up, laying the foundation for a radically
different society built around the responsibility to actively realize our potential.
Rancière’s proclamation of our autonomy also aligns with James’s tendency to favor
those ideas that invite “promise” and possibility.108 In one of his lectures, he describes several
concepts, among them free will and spiritualism, that he argues offer more possibility than their
alternatives. Spiritualism, for example, allows us to escape the inevitable consequences of
materialism, the belief that the physical world is all that exists. Those consequences include the
grim materialistic idea that the entire material world will collapse into nothing on some distant
date. Spiritualism, however, presents the brighter possibility of some afterlife or some rescue
from inevitable death. A belief in free will, similarly, gives us the chance to think beyond a
predetermined course for our lives and to act with the thought that our actions can make a
difference in our lives. Rancière’s focus on effort and recognition of agency is desirable for this
same reason. By focusing on possibility, it “holds up improvement as at least possible” and
justifies continually striving for that improvement.109 If we suppose that our access to intellect is
fixed at different levels, then we have no reason to push ourselves to surpass those levels. This,
then, becomes an issue of motivation and the intricate relationship between what we view as
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possible and what we are inspired to accomplish. In short, Rancière’s understanding of intellect
is a valuable tool for any view of humanity, such as a democratic republic, where full growth and
excellence are worthwhile aims. To expect innately different capacities puts a firm cap on
possibility to the detriment of our human tenacity.
It is equally important to recognize that the world that Rancière constructs is not a
meritocratic ideal, where all are rewarded in equal portion for their efforts. Effort is the operative
force, but what he offers is far from a simple one-to-one equation where effort given equals
outcome achieved. Our recognition, in line with Rancière, that effort plays a crucial role in
accessing intellect does not necessarily mean that effort translates to intellect in equal proportion
for all people. Different circumstances and contexts may well mean that two people reach
different intellectual levels despite exerting the same level of effort. Put another way, the clear
differences in how close we come to our intellectual potential could be a result of any
combination of effort and circumstance. The key, here, is the new assumption that innate talent
does not play an influential role. Our unequal expressions of intellect, for Rancière, cannot be a
result of different capacities for intellect,110 but they can be the consequence of various effort
levels or circumstances.
I cannot do full justice to the intricacies of the meritocratic ideal, or meritocratic myth, in
American society within this space, but it is sufficient to make this distinction. Rancière is
concerned with recognizing equal access to intellect within others and the implications of such
an assumption on how we educate and interact with each other. He does not conclude, nor will I,
that effort is the sole determiner of our intellect. The degree of involvement that circumstance
has here is up for debate. These questions of circumstance are of great importance as we
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continue with this great American experiment and seek to fully understand the struggles and
realities facing our fellow citizens. What is relevant for Rancière and for my discussion here,
however, is understanding the possibilities we create when we start from an assumption of
human potential, instead of human differences and limitations.
Finally, it is worth noting that ideas about human limitations have historically worked
hand-in-hand with the idea that humanity is a will that serves an intellect. That is to say that our
cognition leads the way through processes of thinking followed by our effortful actions. This
view often assumes that humans are inherently rational and that we put our passions to work for
our reason. Rancière and Jacotot reverse the order of this concept when they argue that “man is a
will served by an intellect.”111 They recognize the common assumption that our intellect dictates
how we will act. This assumption might come from the seemingly obvious observation that our
brain controls all of our muscle movements and physical processes. James, drawing again on his
psychological roots, would be sure to remind us that sensations and environment play a key role
in this process of connecting thought and action. Our brain might send the signal to our muscles,
but the environment around us is what sprung our brain into action. This is similar to his
previous assertion that our perceptions come before the concepts we make out of them.112
Barbalet notes that James’s theory of emotion was revolutionary because it recognized
that our physical stimuli-responses sometimes come before our emotional responses.113 By
taking this stance, James points out that our actions often come before our thoughts about those
actions, meaning we are hardly always a will that follows the orders of an intellect. Sometimes
we act and our intellect is left to adapt to those emotional or instinctual responses, like when we
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rashly respond to the hurtful comments of a close friend. If we assume that our intellect is the
only factor that dictates our actions, we overlook the key role that emotion and will play in
defining how we use that intellect in the first place.
This is where the intuitive and spiritual find shelter in Rancière’s and James’s intellect. It
is also where James differs from Freud, Barbalet remarks, because he regards the emotional
components of our brain as vital contributors to both truth and knowledge, where Freud viewed
emotions as untamed urges. Instead of being distrustful of our gut reactions and feelings, James
embraces them as partners in our truth-seeking processes, something I will explore more fully in
the next chapter.114 For those who embrace the role of custom and tradition in our societies, this
recognition of the value of emotion and intuition is fantastic news. It sets the stage for us to place
more value on our traditions when they provide comfort, familiarity, and other positive
emotional responses, even if those traditions contradict reason. In a sense, James aims to temper
the dominance of reason in determining our actions, both personal and collective.
James’s psychology and philosophy bring our focus to these emotional and impassioned
origins and suppose that it is our intellect that serves our wants and our actions. The lack of will
or lack of attention, by extension, would then partly account for differences in how our intellect
expresses itself. When we attend to our equal capacity and allow our desires to reflect confidence
in that equality, we are much more likely to realize our intellectual possibilities.115 Democratic
theorists dream of a reality where citizens of their republic proudly see and exercise their
capacities for intellect and civic participation. Belief in our capabilities makes us much more
likely to see ourselves as worthy partners in the democratic government we occupy. Thomas
Jefferson, echoing the republican idea that power should rest in the hands of the people, argued
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that we should educate people to protect the freedoms and powers of their neighbors from the
wandering eyes of tyranny.116 Here, Rancière and James offer a potential route to achieving this
goal. In a truly republican sense, the onus is ultimately on each citizen to engage in this process
of liberating themselves from a perceived hierarchy through simple recognition of their
intellectual access. Particularly in an American setting, however, this shift cannot be effective
without an accompanying focus on the intuitive and spiritual.
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Chapter 3: Religious Obstacles and Spiritual Opportunities
How many times have we been exposed to the proposition that the United States exists
within a framework of Christian ideals? Between the large fundamentalist Christian population
we house, our history of having prayer and Christian references in the public sphere, and the
dominance of Christian traditions and holidays in our culture, it is easy to see why someone
might come to that conclusion. While the sentiment may be off-putting to many, it is hard to
deny that there is a kernel of truth within it. Many of our founders were self-described deists
rather than Christians, but Christian values influenced their thinking just the same and have
played a crucial role in the movements of the American public for its entire existence. This is
clear despite the continued pushback of secularism and religious neutrality. If we peek beyond
this question of our Christian context, however, we might find a larger concern.
Americans, whether we recognize it or not, are as affected by the pull of tradition,
intuition, and spirit as any other part of the world, and arguably more than some. While we are
not classically superstitious or pagan, large swathes of the public in this country build their
identity on protecting our customs, as people have in every nation since the dawn of time. Our
intuitive and non-rational selves vary from sports fanatic superstitions all the way up to the
robust religious communities that have played a large role in our history. If we are interested in a
comprehensive picture of American life, we cannot afford to gloss over the role these ideas have
played in our lives and cultures. Reason has never been the sole force in dictating our decisionmaking processes, nor should it ever be. Creativity and spontaneity, among many other vital
elements of our lives, require a degree of non-rationality that we can’t find in reason alone.
These issues become even more salient, Robert Nash reminds us, when we consider the
decrease of religiosity within our society. Nash describes America as a country that is pridefully
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committed to “sterile hedonism and competitive individualism” yet secretly drowning in
substance abuse and poor mental health.117 We may not understand the situation as dire, but that
does not make it any less the case. Like Arendt, he sees the crippling loneliness that hangs over
us like a thick fog. For him, the solution is a return towards the spiritual, taking pains to do so
thoughtfully and in concert with intellect. Modernism and Enlightenment ideas, Alexander
agrees, leave us spiritually barren and grasping for the sense of purpose we feel we are
missing.118 Because of this longing, it is not simply the undereducated among us that are liable to
turn to fundamentalist tendencies. It is the hopeless person in general, whether they are made
hopeless by a lack of educational prospects or a nebulous, purposeless world. Simply put, our
world, particularly in an enlightenment lens, too often leaves us with more questions than
answers.
One way we attempt to reach answers to these questions, historically, is through creating
and maintaining faith-based perspectives, which consist of many interconnected non-rational
beliefs. Using an analogy to the scientific method, James refers to these larger systems as our
religious hypotheses and argues that they find their experimental testing ground in “the active
faith of individuals.”119 Much like how a scientist’s individual work serves as a testament to
various theories and approaches, our individual faith work testifies to the validity of the larger
religions or spiritualities that contextualize them. Where previously we might have seen a clear
dichotomy between science, as a field of knowledge built on proof, and faith, as a blatant apathy
to proof, James now finds fertile ground in their coordinated efforts. Because we long for
stability and predictability, he argues, we are absolutists by nature, but we should remain
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experimentalists at the same time.120 Many modern and historical societies have shown their
ability to prioritize empiricism, while others have mastered dogmatism and the absolute, but few
have found a healthy balance. We need to do so, however, in order to further intellectualize an
American society that is so tangled up in the absolutes that religion and spirituality offer.
Considering the more dogmatic group, we also need to think about the implications of
faith-based societies for Rancière and James’s arguments about hierarchy and laziness as limiting
factors in our educational world. At first, James and Hofstadter appear to be presenting an
entirely distinct explanation for why some people might choose to fall back on faith and custom
at the expense of intellect. Diving deeper, however, shows more agreement between the two
analyses, though Hofstadter and James bring important complexity to the table. Rancière
suggests a framework where our pedagogical methods combine with a culture of idleness to stifle
the intellectual development of students through an exclusive understanding of intelligence. The
burden then falls on society, as a collective of people, to flatten the intellectual hierarchy and do
the work to overcome any lingering intellectual gap.
In a similar manner, Hofstadter recalls how religious American people have frequently
fallen into one of two camps: the “disinherited class” or the “possessing class.”121 The
possessors, often rich with clergy and religious study, mirror Rancière’s explicative instructor as
they try to set themselves apart from the disinherited. Those people, locked out of the intellectual
discourse, might then embrace a perspective shift where their lack of knowledge is reframed as a
preference for faith.122 In order to avoid being dismissive of this very real belief, we need to
recognize that faith and a limited focus on intellect serve a positive role for these people. Before
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we can move to a view of spirituality that is hospitable for them, however, we should take
additional time to explore Hofstadter’s account of American spiritual history.
One of the most pivotal moments early in Hofstadter’s work is his diagnosis of the toxic
relationship between fundamentalist Christian parents and institutions of education. Not only is
this relationship central to the spiritual past of our country, but it is particularly relevant for the
vision of education detailed here. If America is suffering from an injurious political and spiritual
impasse, this relationship is the bleeding wound. Its history is long and complex but can be
summarized by saying that a legacy of tumultuous interactions and tensions have created a
situation in which it is challenging for fundamentalist parents to trust the educational institutions
in their communities. As fundamentalism becomes increasingly taboo and the subject of ridicule
in our society, these people find themselves being pushed to the periphery. It is beyond
unrealistic, then, to expect a community that has been left behind or secluded from the
reasonable discourse of our country to concede their children to schools that might turn them
against their very homes and traditions. The threat, real or imagined, of such utter destruction of
families and communities rightfully brings about visceral concerns and a desire to act in
protection of their institutions.123 Parents in this position know, for example, that they cannot win
rational arguments in response to the questions brought forward by schools, primarily because
their religious beliefs do not depend on rationality. With no one present to represent faithful
perspectives in schools or bridge the divide between parents and teachers, communities are
sometimes left with a choice between watching their children abandon family tradition or finding
alternative means of holding their child’s loyalty.
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We cannot pin this response entirely on education and intellectualism, but there is
certainly a pressing need for schools to better address issues of faith in their classrooms. An
assembly line that turns children into uprooted critical thinkers is an inevitable enemy for rooted
communities. On the other hand, a school that deepened local loyalties alongside a liberal,
questioning attitude could be a welcomed friend. Friendship between schools and their
communities may seem like a superficial idea, but it is incredibly important in the context of a
large, spread-out democratic republic. Alexander aims to address this same core issue as he
outlines a vision of “intelligent spirituality.”124 His work brings us through a brief history of
rising modernist thought as well as romantic and postmodernist responses. Ultimately, in the
spirit of James’s pragmatic method, he concludes that we need to recognize, as should sound
familiar at this point, “that each has important contributions to make to living a good life.”125
Overcorrection towards reason or towards faith is an unsatisfactory solution. What we are left
with is a complicated goal of reconciliation. There is no better place, though, to achieve this
reconnection between spirituality and rationalism than the two realms that play the strongest
formative role in a person’s life: their family and their school. The interrelation between these
two areas is a prime example of the closer, inter-personal associations that we need to focus on in
order to fix the larger divides we long to overcome.
Put simply, the stakes underlying this fragmented relationship are twofold. The exit of
Evangelicals, the most powerful religious fundamentalists in America,126 from the intellectual
community leaves our education system devoid of a spiritual essence. Not only that, but it leaves
our faith-based institutions devoid of rigor and popular respectability. Of all the ways in which
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America is a country divided, perhaps none is more consequential than this. Hofstadter, quoting
Sidney E. Mead, laments the “hard choice” Americans have been presented with “between being
intelligent according to the standards prevailing in their intellectual centers, and being religious
according to the standards prevailing in their denominations.”127 In lockstep with each other,
Alexander adds, schools have abandoned religion and religions have abandoned schools. Part of
this is due to a drastic shift in the locus of emotional concerns. Modernism and the secularism
that followed it created a form of public discourse in which our rational capacity crowded out our
emotional capacity.128 Some revivalists and evangelical leaders, in contrast, took the opposite
approach. Hofstadter notes that many of them abandoned their strongest outward emotional
expressions with the increasing wave of modernism, but a vocal portion held on to the utility of
plain speech, tradition, and emotional relatability. This strong-willed set of evangelicals did us a
great service in their stubbornness. To understand exactly why that is and to begin to bridge the
divide, we need to follow Hofstadter’s lead and sympathetically work through what he describes
as the “one-hundred per cent mindset.”129
For most of us, the idea of compromise and nuance is a welcome gift, one that helps us
balance the various concerns that arise in our lives. The “modern political mind” is recognizable
in many democratic states and draws its inspiration from Lockean principles such as the
marketplace of ideas.130 How should we react, however, when the marketplace stacks the cards
against our products and services? How can religious people be expected to make a profit, the
profit of national recognition, if they are disproportionately excluded from the tools needed to
compete? This loose analogy is essentially representative of the situation modern political
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thought places on religious institutions. The thorough separation between religion and intellect
has asked faithful people to translate their interests into a different, seemingly incompatible
language. The resulting unevenness of the playing field has led embittered religious people, like
Billy Graham and his predecessors, to reject the opportunity to compete, almost out of spite.
Though they have their similarities, this move separates him from early revivalists who used
emotionality and spiritual appeal as a tool to supplement intellect. Instead, Graham and his
contemporaries found a way to circumvent the marketplace of ideas by way of emotional appeal
and relatability. Part and parcel of this evasion was a full-scale embrace of an all or nothing
mentality. Utilitarian laypeople, used to being unconditionally excluded and ridiculed as ‘the
other’ by intellectuals and elites, were drawn to the black-and-white, nuance-free moral world on
which Graham and others capitalized. This, as mentioned, represented a clear departure from the
early days of evangelism, which made peace with intellectual rationalism and set its sights on
combatting “religious apathy.”131 In many ways, however, weaponization of the ‘simple’ and
‘clear cut’ is a fully justified response to the encroachment of modernism and absolute
rationalism.
If this one hundred per cent mentality, with its high-stakes moral absolutism, was created
by the divide between rationalism and spirituality, as Alexander and Hofstadter suggest, then the
path forward is likely to reconcile those two poles once again. Eliminate the need for religious
people to circumvent rational forms of discourse, and we just might be able to bring them into
the fold once again. In doing so, we also might address Rancière’s concerns about the
institutionalization of a ‘superior intellectual class’ in America. This hierarchy, far from the
difference between steps on an Olympic podium, currently resembles a stark chasm with a good
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number of Americans standing on either side. We may often perceive that intellectual elites,
especially those on the east coast, stand a head above those in the middle of the country. The
election of Donald Trump and the events that have followed, about which I will say little else,
should stand as proof to us, however, that rationalists and spiritualists are not too dissimilar in
the level of influence they can leverage over our political and cultural landscape. Our first step in
response to this realization ought to be recognition that we stand as a nation divided on issues of
reason and faith, but not divided in the power available to those groups. From that recognition,
we should be able to move closer to the fulfillment of an educational and political system built
on assumptions of equal intellectual capacity.
More than just reconciling the dangerous split between spirituality and rationalism,
however, this path forward also promises to instill a much richer sense of the responsible
democratic republicanism of which Jefferson dreamed. Hofstadter and Alexander lay down
strong evidence that our country has suffered from a serious abdication of responsibility.
Rationalists have neglected their duty to nurture the spiritual side of their fellow citizens, and
spiritualists have neglected their duty to develop the rational side. The result is a stratified
society that permeates our political, educational, and cultural demographic definitions. The
stereotypical fundamentalist, ignorant, largely rural, conservatives of our current moment are put
in contrast with the stereotypical tolerant, liberally educated, largely urban liberals. This leads us
to a scaled-up version of the one hundred per cent mindset that Hofstadter describes, with each
side of the division believing they have moral, educational, and political superiority over the
other. Our political gridlock and all of the accompanying ideological trappings pull themselves
roughly from the same origins as our educational, cultural, and spiritual divisions. This is not to
oversimplify, but rather to serve as a reminder that the many distinct divisions we often find in
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our society may not be as distinguishable from each other as we think. If we want to move
forward as a country in which some semblance of unity is possible, failure to recognize our
spiritual wounds alongside our well-established political wounds is not an option.
Before we can address these wounds, however, it is important that we firmly establish the
rational and non-rational as equally worthy players in our lives and decision-making. This is far
from a common assumption. Often, we prioritize one over the other, depending on the
circumstance, identity, or role. James notes how scientists are often quick to outwardly reject
immutable absolutes.132 Modern religious leaders, on the other hand, might be much more reliant
on non-rational, spiritual claims. This distinction seems clear, but in his retelling of American
Protestant history, Hofstadter argues that “the truth is more complex.” Religious leaders have
often gone to great lengths to promote academic and educational endeavors, so long as they do
so in a religious framework. The American Massachusetts Bay community proves an interesting
case study for Hofstadter as he uncovers their conflicted historical relationship with reason-based
education. The famed educational brands of Oxford, Harvard, and Cambridge all share tangents
with life in this community, alongside the often-ridiculed Salem Witch Trials. In essence, this
conflict is a microcosm of the larger trends of American Protestant history, filled with its highly
educated clergy and its boisterous lay preachers. Rationality and non-rationality find themselves
in a delicate dance across communities and eras like the New England Puritans and the American
Great Awakening.133
Perhaps the most interesting part of Hofstadter’s analysis, however, comes as he
describes the spread of Protestant revivalism, a particularly potent blend of spiritualism and nonrationality, in America. Firmly subscribing to a Rancière-esque belief that all humans are equally
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worthy of being heard, he asks his reader to imagine life as an undereducated frontiersperson. In
the absence of opportunities to pursue book learning and all of its benefits, certainly we might
turn to the same fanaticism and spiritual reliance that characterized many descriptions of
religious revivalism. Faith, as we have seen, might become a response to the lack of intellectual
access and a means of breaking “the hold of the establishments.”134 Such responses are
inextricably tied, Hofstadter notes, to early democratic movements within the United States, as
they hold the common goal of increasing access to representation in various communities and
institutions. In this sense, Rancière and the American revivalists are responding to the same
realities and pushing a progressive agenda towards a truer and flatter democracy.
The revivalists, however, backed themselves into a problematic corner when they
discarded not only the hierarchy of religious authority but also the tools which make for
insightful religious study. It is one thing to attack the elite, educated class in your religious
community and to free yourself from the oppression that class leverages against you. It is entirely
another to, as my father always says, throw the baby out with the bathwater and abandon the
important tools of reason and intellect that the elite class previously hoarded. All too often
movements like the protestant Christian revivals have done just that: casting off anything that
was even touched by the old guard in the name of a new order. Nor is this approach unique to
them, as many modern educational thinkers have advocated for abandoning certain methods of
thinking purely because of their ties to oppressive classes. For religious communities, however,
Hofstadter argues that this concern points to a central tension in both religious and more general
forms of education: whether one should work towards “a historically correct and rational
understanding” or towards working up “a proper sense of inner conviction.”135
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In a sense, this distinction gets to the heart of one of James’s key arguments about the
place we ought to leave for faith in our lives. A balance is in order, he argues, between positions
“of believing too little or of believing too much.”136 We would be foolish to think that we could
ever avoid taking some things on faith. We may be among the most rational and intellectually
flexible people on the planet but set back on our reflexes we would still “dogmatize like
infallible popes.”137 The barest example of this is our trust in the very fact that truth exists in any
definable quality. Such a conclusion cannot be definitively proven, at least by our current
standards and with our current knowledge, so we must take it on faith.138 Accordingly, we would
be foolish to try to argue that faith has no place in our lives, even if the place it occupies is
smaller for some than others. The key questions become what place it ought to occupy and how
we balance it with the space we set aside for reason. These are questions we have run from for
too long, particularly in the world of education, and they are crucial in our efforts to rethink
spirituality in a way that is compatible with any form of intellectual emphasis.
Reflecting further on the partnership between rationality and spirituality, William James
reminds us that they live in tight connection with one another.139 Those who follow his logic
might even go so far as to say that no person can truly hold one quality without the other. Here
the very idea that one might want to be purely intuitive or rational seems to make no sense. We
would be missing a fundamental part of our humanity. In this light, the arguments of Alexander
and Hofstadter take on new life. Alexander’s connection with James’s ideas is especially
noteworthy as his three components of spirituality, subjective, objective, and collective, interact
neatly with the ways in which James seeks to understand human knowledge. Additionally, both
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Alexander and James argue that we ought to strive for a harmonious, holistic conception of
human existence that strongly balances each component. This conception, they continue, finds
grounding in the larger activity of creating a medium for ethical dialogue and collective life,
particularly in a democratic focus. Despite this, societies around the world, particularly
American society, still fall into the two dangerous vices: either focusing singularly on the
individual elements rather than the embodied whole or denying the expansive inclusivity of both
spiritual and intellectual life. Before we can move to discuss a form of education that seeks to act
on and cultivate equal intellectual and spiritual access, though, we need to take some time to
understand what it means to take a broader vision of spirituality.

Expanding Spirituality
William James, throughout his life and writings, thinks along these lines when he urges
us to consider the faithful and spiritual together with the rational. As a philosopher who writes
extensively about the importance of belief and religious experiences, James’s life work is a
testament to the significance of both of these human qualities. His ideas take on a new richness
against the continuing backdrop of intellectual division that we developed in the previous
sections. Hofstadter’s work, in particular, highlights the importance of understanding religious
and spiritual anti-intellectualism if we ever hope to achieve the intellectual possibilities that
authors like Rancière propose. Unless we grapple with the concerns of fundamentalists and
evangelicals, non-rationality and its more hostile manifestation, anti-intellectualism, will make it
impossible to reach a vision of greater intellectual access. By that, I mean that it will be
incredibly difficult to make any progress while part of society rejects the value of what we are
trying to make accessible. This means, as I have suggested, that we need to reconcile intellectual
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and spiritual pursuits, in search of a more holistic conception of life and human development
both for the sake of pragmatic inclusion and well-rounded growth.
A number of noteworthy educational thinkers have sought to tackle these same questions,
each with their own scope and perspective. Their thoughts are important to mention here both
because I am approaching these problems from an interdisciplinary educational theory angle and
because few arenas in our life are more concerned with human development and life than our
schools. Though there are certainly others who have also made insightful additions to this
conversation, I will enter the discourse here by focusing on three authors in particular: Katherine
Simon, Robert Kunzman, and Nel Noddings. Each finds, as I have, their own reasoning and
inspiration for discussing spiritual and existential issues in the context of schooling. Kunzman,
for example, recognizes that religiously motivated people within America have more fully
recognized their political power in recent years.140 No longer do they think their convictions
should be shelved in the private world and never touched in public conversation. In this context,
it is better to bring them into the fold, starting as early as their public-school experiences, than to
leave them to their own devices in secluded, though robust, corners of the country.
Simon recognizes something similar in the false choice that has been set up for us
between scientific knowledge and a form of “highly-politicized” spiritual connection.141 People,
in other words, are told they can either subscribe to the world of academia or to a distorted
version of traditional religions. The exclusivity of academia and distortion of these religions
keeps us from being able to grasp both in tandem. In this context, and drawing on the ideas of
Michael Novak, Noddings reminds us of the idea that intelligent believers (i.e., intelligent

140

Robert Kunzman, Grappling with the Good: Talking about Religion and Morality in Public Schools.
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).
141
Katherine G. Simon, Moral Questions in the Classroom: How to Get Kids to Think Deeply about Real
Life and their School Work. (London: Yale University Press, 2001), p. 11.

83
religious adherents) may have more in common with intelligent unbelievers than they do with
unintelligent believers.142 There is untapped potential, she might agree, in the possibility of
bringing the world of believers and the secular world into closer contact within the framework of
intelligence or intellect. To do so, Noddings presents a broader understanding of rationality that
works well with James’s rationality and, I argue, Alexander’s expanded spirituality. This ‘new’
rationality “recognizes the longing of the heart and soul and provides for them.” 143 Increased
self-knowledge, both in the individual-self and the group-self, is crucial to Noddings’s
conception of intelligence. In fact, she argues, if someone is not consistently “thinking through
the questions that arise regularly in life,” they would be hard-pressed to claim intelligence.144
These concerns are not merely religious, as I have argued. David Purpel, who serves as
an important source of thinking for both Kunzman and Simon, receives a central placement in
Kunzman’s argument as he claims that “no set of issues is as explosive, controversial, emotional,
and threatening as moral and religious disputes” but “none is more vital.”145 Because of this
inevitability, these questions have a central role to play in education, though Kunzman sees the
current climate of detachment and empty tolerance as entirely unsatisfactory. This is, at least in
part, because students who have grown up with richer and more substantive ethical and religious
frameworks will inevitably find the hollow moral teachings of school to be a less attractive
alternative.146 Citing Robert Wuthnow, he notes the American move away from loving our
spiritual or religious place and towards a posture of spiritual seeking that consumes religion and
turns it into “a kind of optional garment: often useful, handily accessorized, and readily changed
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to suit one’s personal tastes.”147 Similar logic prompts Noddings to argue that schools have a
major role in developing an understanding of intelligent belief (or unbelief). Students need to
have a strong, justified sense of the complexity within their religious framework or lack thereof
and how that fits into their lives. Not only, she argues, is the idea of belief and what we should
believe in central to education, but it is also important for students to have a degree of religious
familiarity within the larger frame of cultural literacy.148
Towards the end of establishing her own concern with this central tension in modern
education, Simon brings our focus towards some concrete examples of how we have developed
moral and existential education over the years. Beginning with an approach that seeks to teach
commonly agreed upon values like respect and honesty, she agrees with the importance of
having stable virtues. Especially in the context of a democracy, however, those values must be
up for deliberation, and students need to be able to develop ownership of them. On the opposite
extreme, an approach that considers all values as equally valid and focuses more on the process
of deliberation runs into its own problems. By not holding up any evaluative criteria, this
strategy falls into a relativistic camp that leaves students ill-equipped to make any decisions on
their own. Similarly, she finds the psychologically rooted perspective of cognitive
developmentalists to be too detached from the concrete realities and commitments students find
in their lives.149
After careful review, Simon finds herself agreeing most with the ethic of care, an
approach set forth by Noddings that aims to reorganize the curriculum around an understanding
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of morality that is more inclusive of feminist perspectives and values. This approach, in simple
terms, prioritizes respect and caring for others, two components that Simon, Kunzman, and
Noddings can all agree on. Despite this, Simon regards Noddings’s restructuring of the school as
a little too radical. She would prefer, as I would, to operate within the existing organization of a
school and its curriculum. This discussion of the urgencies of the issue and previous approaches
leads Simon to her own suggestion: “a schoolwide inquiry into values.”150 Here, school
communities would come together to construct an open and flexible strategy for addressing
moral and existential issues, recognizing the inevitability both of having some prescriptions and
of critical deliberation. Simon and I disagree in a number of smaller areas, particularly the use of
the terms spiritual151 and the intensity of our response to the critiques made by church and state
separatists.152 That said, our central arguments do not disagree; we have entirely different
focuses. Simon is interested in considering how schools should approach moral and existential
issues that inevitably arise in the classroom. Those questions are certainly important, but I am
more interested in further mapping out the breathing room schools and students have in making
spiritual space in their education.
Noddings, then, brings us a little closer to where I hope to go. She proposes a philosophy
of education that includes religious and spiritual understanding among its priorities. Students, she
argues, need to understand how religious perspectives play a role in certain controversial
conversations and question-based dialogues throughout human life. In the process, she carves out
space for meaningful connections in the humanities as well as math and science, pointing out that

150
Simon, 2001. This, as Simon presents it, stands in contrast to a classroom-wide inquiry into values or
even one conducted in people’ departments or groups of teachers.
151
Simon thinks that the idea of spirituality is too loaded to use the way I have, but I think we need to lean
into this historical misconception if we want to have any hope of correcting it.
152
Simon also tends to agree with the hesitancy of these separatists, while I wholeheartedly disagree with
their unwillingness to engage with challenging questions about incorporating spirituality into schools.

86
bringing these connections into the curriculum suggests to students that all humans struggle with
these questions and that their struggles are important.153 These questions, ultimately, can become
the “organizational backbone” of a dynamic and intensely interesting curriculum.154 Again,
however, they are not merely relevant for religious students. Everyone can benefit from this kind
of approach, she claims, because both intelligent belief and intelligent unbelief require a clear
sense of the God or gods at play. This goal of developing an intelligent belief or unbelief among
students is certainly admirable and worthwhile; however, Noddings is not entirely clear about
who should be driving the proverbial bus in these efforts. At various points in her discussion, she
talks about how students need to know some things and might be interested in others. In keeping
with Rancière’s respect for student agency and intellectual competency, I aim to take a stronger
stance against the potential for hierarchical teaching that Noddings leaves on the table. This, in
addition to Simon’s well-founded concern about the radical nature of redesigning school
structures, leads me to differentiate my view from Noddings’s, though much of what she adds to
the discourse remains helpful for my discussion.
This leaves me with the picture that Kunzman brings forth, which I think, while still
different in important ways, comes the closest of the three to establishing a place for spirituality
within education. His proposal, almost a marriage between Noddings’s and Simon’s, looks to
develop a form of “ethical dialogue” that emphasizes understanding, empathy, and perspectivetaking. At the same time, however, he brings in a concern for fallibilism, civic virtues, and tight
integration of the religiously motivated, each of which will be central for me in the sections that
follow. His approach is seriously limited in one important way that Noddings’s is not: he
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presents this approach almost exclusively in the context of controversial discussions. In this
respect, as I mentioned, it is important to hold onto the qualities of a more expansive perspective
like that which Noddings provides. His approach, however, comes to bear on an important
process of interpersonal respect that is more textured than what Noddings offers in her work on
intelligent belief. Bringing in Stephen Darwall’s conception of two-fold respect, Kunzman notes
that we often have a shallow understanding of both the evaluative “appraisal respect” and the
ever-important “recognition respect.”155
In turning to a brand of recognition respect that simply looks to emphasize our
similarities and promote bland tolerance, he argues that we actually fall back into “a lack of
respect,” as we essentially say: “I don’t care enough to do the hard work of understanding why
you believe what you do, so I’ll just put up with it.”156 This is strikingly similar to the ideas of
Wuthnow and Rosenblith, whom he draws on and whom I will mention later, as he looks to
establish a form of pluralism that is much more demanding than our current approach. His
‘ethical dialogue’ can help us to overcome this unsatisfying approach to addressing spiritual
diversity in the classroom because it emphasizes, in ways that Noddings and Simon do not, the
importance of rootedness. This idea of being rooted, an important one for Arendt as well, is
central to a fully developed respect for the depth of religious perspectives. Kunzman notes, as I
will further explain shortly, that the current lack of value placed on rootedness “provokes many
conservative religious families to turn elsewhere for their children’s education.” 157 We must, he
stresses, find ways to keep religious students in the fold within public education and engage them
in healthy forms of ethical dialogue with their peers.
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This approach sums up my concerns and interests in tackling these issues of spiritual
access. However, Kunzman, Simon, and Noddings all stop short in one key dimension that is
crucial for my argument. It can be summed up best by considering Simon’s invocation of Robert
Maynard Hutchins, who argued that schools, families, and religious organizations each house
exclusive control of a distinct sphere of human life.158 Where Simon’s response is somewhat
diplomatic in walking the line between too much overlap and too little, I think we ought to lean
into the potential overlap here, fully in defiance of Hutchins’ analysis. Both properly exploring
the spiritual space within public education and fully embracing the role of public schools as part
of a vibrant public require demand that we loosen our unfounded but understandable fears about
public schools and religious organizations interacting. That said, I will by no means argue that
religious leaders need to have a seat at the decision-making table. My interest is more in making
sure that we do not kill collaborative momentum, as we have for so long, before it even has time
to develop. The substantive shape for these potential connections is beyond the scope of my
work here but deserves sustained attention as we press forward in our American experiment.
There are other approaches to integrating religion into schools that are more steeped in
religious instruction. Walter Feinberg and Richard Layton, for example, center their analysis on
instruction that ‘teaches about religion’ rather than ‘teaching religion’. In the process, they note
the benefits of approaching the Bible from both a humanistic and literacy perspective, exploring
the potential alternatives that exist within each of those frames. Not only can the Bible provide a
rich network of stories for literature studies, but comprehensive religious surveys can help us
learn how to interact better with the religious others we are bound to encounter in our lives. Twin
processes of “interruption” of students’ religious inertia and “detachment” from their
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commitment allow students to deepen their intellectual engagement with religious texts like the
Bible. Feinberg and Layton also note the potential and problems inherent in partnership between
schools and their communities on religious matters. In many ways, this is closer to the vision of
intellectuospirituality I am interested in, though its narrow application to religion courses makes
it more detached and less fruitful than the three authors mentioned above.159
As those authors suggest, bridging the divide between the secular public-school world
and the spiritual realms of life demands that we first broaden our understanding of what it means
to be spiritual. This may be difficult for both religious and secular groups to accept, but the plain
truth, as many have argued, is that no human being lives outside the range of a wide-reaching
conception of spirituality. This spirituality, best understood as a form of transcendence-based
affinity, is what enables us to look beyond the naked empiricism and sensationalism that thinkers
like John Dewey and William James found so flawed. A full understanding of what this looks
like, however, will warrant more detail and attention than I can fully accomplish here, and even
then, it certainly is not without its critics. The separation of church and state, for example, stands
as an imposing barrier to an intellectuospiritual marriage, especially in schools. Here, Nash and
the three authors above point to a fruitful solution, arguing that this separation still leaves room
for these kinds of discussion in schools.160 This, combined with the aforementioned works of
Suzanne Rosenblith and Robert Wuthnow on the need for a more reflective and demanding form
of pluralism, sets the stage wonderfully for Alexander to enter the conversation. My chosen
author for this crucial holistic spirituality, Alexander offers an image that eloquently combines
the objective, subjective, and collective spiritual worlds.
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Towards a New American Spiritual Life
Early in his work, Alexander draws on the Biblical story of the Israelites wandering in the
desert searching for the promised land in order to help us frame the spiritual dilemma
swallowing modern American culture. Like the Israelites, we are a people without a home,
“searching for values and visions in the moral desert of modernity.”161 This sentiment will likely
raise suspicion or dismissal from many religious people who feel very at home within their
religious traditions. As Alexander moves into his description of the three shapes of spirituality,
however, he crafts a clear and holistic conception of spirituality that most, if not all, modern
religious traditions certainly fall short of.162 The target he sets is high, but all the better to propel
us forward in our efforts to achieve spiritual excellence.
Before moving into the specifics of his insightful spiritual framework, he takes time to
lay down a particular and crucial set of conditions for us to bear in mind as we strive for this
more holistic spiritualism. Drawing on Karl Popper’s idea of “the open society,” he offers up
“critical intelligence, free will, and fallibility” as key preconditions of productive ethical
deliberation.163 The ability of people within a society to actively explore reason, to make
autonomous decisions, and to fall short of right action are all keys in both human learning and
properly conceived human government. To be uncritically accepting, deterministic, or to carry an
air of infallibility would destroy the possibility of ethical deliberation: the natural medium of
ethical affairs in a democracy.
Moving, as I have, in the context of a Judeo-Christian frame, Alexander even goes so far
as to argue that these three capacities are what bring Adam and Eve closer to God in the Garden
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of Eden. God, he argues, is our role model when He (to adopt Alexander’s gendered notion of
God) falls short in His autonomous actions. By saying this, Alexander leaves us with a puzzling
contradiction between the common conception of God as perfect and this new idea of God as
fallible. Can God be perfectly fallible? Such a question may seem to stray far from educational
issues, but Alexander holds up our fallibility as, arguably, the most important requirement of
education and learning.164 Our philosophies about fallibility, religiously informed or not, are vital
to the ability to partake in the world of education. Without fallibility, we would be “incapable of
benefiting from the opportunity to learn from [our] mistakes.”165 This speaks to the vision of God
that Alexander works with throughout the text. For him, God of the Old Testament is perfectly
fallible, however we might conceive of that, and leads us by example in straying from principle
and ultimately returning to the right path.
An interesting consequence of this view is that teaching and parenting become almost
sacramental because they see us taking on the role that God occupies in our lives: someone who
models learning in the face of mistakes and eternally works towards principle.166 Those who
disagree with Alexander on this point are likely to find the rest of his argument hard to follow,
and, therefore, it is important to spend some time here thinking through this basic assumption.
One possible justification for this perfect fallibility he seems to work with is that it provides a
clear and coherent explanation for the shift from an often vengeful and righteous God to a loving
and merciful God. What Alexander is trying to do here is thread a needle between the Biblical
evidence that God is inconsistent (in human terms) and the bedrock belief that God is perfect and
consistent. Neither, if we are honest with ourselves, is a disputable claim within common
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Biblical understandings of who God is, but the two seem wholly incompatible. One way to
quickly write off of this tension would be to remind that God defies human understanding, and,
therefore, He can be both inconsistent and consistent, or can be consistent in His inconsistencies.
This stated belief that God is simply beyond our ability to sketch out is certainly a
palatable argument for many, but for the rest, Alexander’s coexistence between perfection and
fallibility offers a more nuanced alternative. God is still distinct from humans, either because He
always learns from His mistakes or because His mistakes are always done with the purest
intentions, but God is also fallible. If God’s fallibility was a stand-alone fact, leaving room for
the idea that He is indistinct from humanity, then Alexander would be doing some form of
damage to the Biblical representation of God. By assuming both fallibility and distinction,
however, he seems to remain faithful to that representation. One mistake made by both
academics and fundamentalists, Alexander might argue, is to oversimplify the Biblical body of
knowledge about God. Fundamentalists and academics alike might suggest that, because God is
presented as being apart from learning, those who aspire to emulate the essence of God ought to
reject learning as it is traditionally understood. Another way of saying this is that untested
absolutes are the language of religion and tested conclusions are the language of the academic.
Here, Alexander looks to crash through this dividing line between untested absolutes and tested
conclusions with his conception of God.
With this loose but definitive stance on the nature of God in place, we can move to
discuss Alexander’s holistic view of spirituality and the three forms on which it feeds. These
forms line up somewhat like the ends and middle of a continuum, though Alexander argues that
we can and should hold tight to each of them.167 Despite what modern discourse might tell us,
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these forms of spirituality do not map neatly onto the two sides of the dividing line. Academics
and ‘liberals’ do not neatly fall within the subjectivist category any more than fundamentalists
and ‘conservatives’ neatly fall into the objectivist category. Rather, each side draws heavily but
imperfectly from all three forms of spirituality. My hope here, in further developing an
understanding of spirituality recognizable within all of us, is to think through how both sides can
more fully recover each of the three spiritual forms and draw nearer to each other in the process.
Beginning with the subjective form of spirituality, Alexander starts with a key
distinction: those who believe in “transcendental subjectivism” are markedly different than those
who believe in “radical subjectivism.”168 The first argues that our subjective experiences can
help us climb closer to a transcendent truth or being, while the more radical form tells us that all
that exists in our spiritual life is subjective experience. This differentiation is important to
remember, because subjectivism, like many philosophies, is often attacked by targeting the more
radical component and lumping the moderate perspectives in with this criticism. Alexander finds
the more moderate, transcendental perspective more appealing, especially as it manifests through
the spiritual ideas of Thomas Merton and Hasidic Judaism. Each holds out a mystical, emotiondriven conception of connection with the divine, but becomes transcendent when it argues that
we should seek to transcend those subjective emotions to connect with the absolute.169
Merton leans on the self-oriented process of “contemplation.” Taking up a posture of
reflection, he argues, can lead us to overcome the ‘false self’ that we often idealize and “to
discover [our true selves] in discovering God.”170 Similarly, for Hasidic Jews and those who
follow the traditions of Lurianic myths, our spiritual life involves fine-tuning our personal Torah.
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This subjective understanding then serves as our working version until the day we return to God
and unite our Torah with His. Both approaches urge humans to grapple with their deeply
personal and intuitive perspectives in the hopes of using them to move beyond the subjective.
The transcendental approach distinguishes itself from the radical approach in that way: viewing
subjectivism as an instrument rather than an end. This distinction, Alexander notes, is key to
keeping subjectivism from turning into the narcissistic idol that its opponents often fear.171
Of course, the countervailing forces of objectivism and collectivism also help anchor us
and protect against radical subjectivity, but before shifting to focus on collective spirituality, it
seems important to briefly recap those key elements of transcendental subjectivism which are
worth holding to most tightly. First and foremost is the room such an approach leaves for
intuition and emotion within a person’s life. For those who are turned away by the dry, unfeeling
realities of institutionalized religion and academia, subjectivism offers a reprieve. In its quest to
legitimize spirituality, it does not ask people to employ reason or logic. It softly reminds us that
our gut and heart are enough. This message should not stand entirely by itself and allow people
total release from reason and proof, but it does offer us an important service by allowing some
emancipation. Additionally, the subjective spirituality Alexander outlines here makes for a
potentially fruitful connection between post-modern thought and the spiritual realm. Alexander
notes that academia and religious people have each embraced subjectivism to varying degrees,
but rarely are the two brought into concert with each other, likely in large part because
subjectivism is viewed as reprehensible by some religious orthodoxy.172 If, guided by
Alexander’s ideas, we can promote an embrace of transcendental subjectivism within institutions
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of intellect and spirituality, we might better be able to bring these communities together and find
space for emotion and individual experiences within our educational efforts.
An important partner, as mentioned, in this endeavor is the collective spirituality that
Alexander outlines in his next chapter, widening the scope from individual experiences to those
of larger bodies of people. This is where the organizing power of religious communities comes
into the picture. As much as spirituality and intellectual endeavors are individual experiences,
they are undeniably formed, in large part, by the groups where they develop. No two religious or
areligious communities develop spirituality in the same way, just as no two neighborhoods build
the same cultural understandings and tastes. Community is important for us, Alexander argues,
because of the solidarity it provides and the reassurance that our ideas line up with those of other
people we respect.173 As strongly as we might believe in certain tenets, customs, or spiritual
truths, we still need some measure of communication with others to verify the strength of those
commitments. Humans, as I mentioned earlier, are deeply social. Much like how transcendental
subjectivism looks to find ground between the individual and the absolute, collectivism affords
us the opportunity to find overlap between ourselves and others. There is certainly safety in
numbers, but there is a self-confidence to be gained as well.
Just like the radical and moderate form of subjectivism, however, collectivism also
contains different strains. Radical collectivism looks a lot like cultural relativism, a familiar
source of controversy in American discourse. It proposes to us that all cultural norms are equally
valid and make up the body of what we can consider to be truth. According to this theory, there
is no transcendent set of understandings we can access or grow closer to in informing our
connection with truth. Because of this, it leaves little to no room for interaction with an

173

Alexander, 2001, p. 78.

96
expansive understanding of objective spirituality, something I have held up as important here for
a well-rounded spiritual life. The alternative collective approach, transcendentalism, addresses
these concerns by telling us that our engagement with the cultures and communities around us
serves to bring us closer to a tangible, transcendence. It not only gives us the ability to condemn
certain culturally based spiritual practices but also allows us to meaningfully consider collective
alternatives and the progress they allow us to make.174
In other words, a transcendent form of collectivism bridges the divide between
community values and objective absolutes. It sits in the middle of the complicated and wellreinforced spiritual and intellectual life that Alexander conceptualizes. Not only can people
transcend themselves toward the objective and the collective, but our individual experiences can
pull on communities and the objective receives a dose of culture and personalism. This web
quickly devolves into meaningless and empty drivel, however, if we fail to notice Alexander’s
plea for strong grounding in each of the distinct forms. There is no need or time for hollow
happy sloganeering and impersonal politeness training. Students need to proudly own their
particular individuality and their particular cultural spaces alongside the universal or undeniable.
Particularism, for Alexander, provides the bricks which make up the building. They need spackle
to hold them together but imagine a building without bricks.175
Alexander and many others find the particular bricks that make up their spiritual
buildings in the world of objective spirituality. Rituals, traditions, holidays, religious services,
liturgies, and faith communities provide tangible material with which to construct our individual
faith experiences. This is primarily where evangelicals and other fundamentalists often feel the
most at home. Even beyond the realm of organized religion, Alexander argues that traditional
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canons and scientific processes provide this same form of objective content. Like its subjective
and collective counterparts, objective spirituality can be broken into radical and moderate strains,
with the moderate contributing more to a holistic spirituality. The moderate, or fallible, objective
perspective looks to make “a rigorous differentiation” between reality and the ways humans have
sought to understand it.176 The ultimate reality of an apple, in other words, is distinct from the
same apple experienced through our human senses. In doing this, fallible objectivism also holds
up the assumption that humans are incapable of perfectly encapsulating reality in even our most
complex depictions of it.
This fallibility, however, is not an excuse to abandon the often absolutist world of
traditions and rituals. Instead, we should lean into those rituals, with a certain perspective. To
define this important perspective, Alexander pulls from interpretations of the Judeo-Christian
prophet Isaiah who taught that our religious rituals “lead us to take the steps required to
repent.”177 Here, traditions become reminders or the object of our reflection that can push us in
our efforts to further develop ourselves. A far cry from the dry understanding of religious ritual
most Americans hold, Protestant thinker Paul Tillich adds that “an act of faith…is a finite act
with all the limitations of a finite act, and it is an act in which the infinite participates beyond the
limitations of a finite act.”178 This duality strongly resembles William James’s intermingling
abstract and concrete. It also breathes new life into the abandoned, but richly productive vision
of spiritual tradition that Isaiah put forth many centuries prior. Our acts are naturally grounded in
the limits of human circumstances, yet still house immense power to connect us to the infinite
and divine.
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Jewish existentialism, which Alexander presents following Tillich’s work, pulls these
ideas further into the educational space, arguing that Jewish educative efforts should take what
students have learned and transform it “into a teaching (Lehre) that becomes a guidepost for
living.”179 Like Isaiah and Tillich, thinkers like Franz Rosenzweig and Parker Palmer push us to
take the tangible, seemingly empty routines we find in organized religion and transform them
into a personally meaningful “guidepost.”180 Here, perhaps more than anywhere else in
Alexander’s discussion of spirituality, it becomes clear that schools and other educational
institutions have a key role to play. They are crucial in the effort to turn traditions into dynamic
educative experiences. Towards the end of his discussion of objectivism, Alexander argues that
we need to build new “sanctuaries” in which we can develop and practice this objective
spirituality alongside its subjective and collective complements.181 Where better to begin
building these centers of community than one of the strongest bastions for community in human
life: our schools? Suzanne Rosenblith begins to imagine a similar transformation of our public
schools as she analyzes the, often empty, religious pluralism that currently exists within them.
Citing the objective, “epistemic” concerns as an important component of the education schools
should hope to provide, she reaches towards a deeper form of pluralism, one that places a
responsibility on us in addition to toothless tolerance.182
Before moving into the ideas of Rosenblith and those of Robert Wuthnow, which will
move us into our discussion of how intellectual and spiritual access can coexist within a school,
we ought to take a few minutes to reflect on the dangerous, radical side of objective spirituality.
In its most recognizable form, radicalism resembles the religious fundamentalism that Hofstadter
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details within the American cultural sphere. While Alexander’s descriptions of fundamentalism
mostly mirror Hofstadter’s, he does introduce two novel forms of objective spirituality that are
worthy of our attention, especially in the context of education. The first, “traditionalism,” draws
on the canonical movements like the ‘great books’ work of Robert M. Hutchins and others. The
idea that truth should be found in the study of a selected set of texts, Alexander argues, often
creates a concerning dogmatic reliance on an ‘infallible’ set of ideas that limits the scope of
ethical deliberation. This is not to say that these books and works of art may not have cultural
values, but such understandings should fit squarely into the collective rather than objective realm
of our lives. Similarly, and secondly, he argues that the practice of “scientism” involves a
dogmatic reliance on the principles of reason and scientific methodology as an infallible path to
truth.183 Alexander borrows from M. Scott Peck to argue that mature scientists recognize “that
science may be as subject to dogmatism as any other religion.”184 In fact, any source of
knowledge that is taken as solely authoritative and infallible can lead us into these pitfalls. As
such, these specific concerns, canonical dogmatism and scientific dogmatism, are key concerns
for schools to keep in mind both in general and as they look to dip their toes more into the work
of spiritual development.
In some ways, these non-religious forms of objective spirituality may even be more
dangerous than religious fundamentalism, since their potential to do harm and produce closedmindedness is often overlooked and is couched in the higher pursuit of rationalism. The effects
of unfettered objectivism remain potent in these areas, however, because each encourages some
level of unquestioning acceptance. Unrelenting traditionalists lose a great deal of important
insight and deliberative potential because they seek to place infallible limits around the sources
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of our knowledge and wisdom. There is value in differentiating between quality and less quality
works, but such efforts become harmful when they become a limiting exercise. The same can be
said for those who worship science as a pure search for truth, ignoring the fact that its human
origins mean that there are human assumptions and biases built into the scientific method. This
particular danger speaks to an overlooked component of modernism, which has taught many
Americans to place reason and science above all else as sources of knowledge.
To fully appreciate the parallel Alexander is trying to establish, it is important to
remember that he includes science and non-religious traditionalism under the umbrella of
spirituality. Each, like religion, serves to help us transcend ourselves by way of a group identity
and shared practices or beliefs. They are bound by their similar functions and goals. As such, it is
important to maintain this well-rounded understanding of spirituality for all people throughout
their educational experiences. To give non-religious children a pass from these kinds of
reflection and study does damage not only to them but also to their classmates, particularly if this
pass perpetuates a new or old spiritual divide in our country. It is no accident that Maria
Montessori’s fundamental human needs include a discussion of our spiritual needs. It would
make little sense to speak of such needs as fundamental if they were not present in all humans,
and it would make even less sense to deny some people access to spiritual nourishment in their
education on the basis of their religious identity. What is left, then is to puzzle out how these
complementary access goals, the intellectual and spiritual, can be realized in an educational
setting and to further sketch out the stakes and benefits of such efforts.
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Chapter 4: Intellectuospiritual Education
Educational efforts are always met with more demands than they might ever be able to fit
into a child’s schooling experience. These confines are a natural part of our efforts to grow,
develop, and learn in our limited years on Earth. Much has been written, for example, about the
problem of teaching history and deciding what to prioritize in the curriculum. All academic
disciplines feel the crunch to some degree, even those areas of schooling that are not neatly
categorized within disciplines, such as moral and health education. By no means am I looking to
add to the already overstuffed list of tasks placed in front of schools and educators. In part, that is
why I have tried to frame this argument around two familiar areas of interest that can be tailored
to the particulars of a given school’s situation. Intellectual and spiritual access are expansive
ideas, each of which could easily make up a large portion of our educational careers. I hope,
however, we can move past the ideas that the intellectual piece is satisfied by an introduction to
scholarship and that the spiritual piece fits neatly within religious survey courses. Certainly, we
might want to expose our young citizens to these kinds of experiences, but we should also aim,
as I have argued here, for something more substantive and personal.
I am interested, here, in the philosophical shift that has been recommended by many
writers, including those I have introduced so far, away from a hierarchical and impersonal
education. Such a shift, these authors suggest, squares much more with those ideas we have used
to build our democratic and republican ideals. It represents, in some ways, a recalibration that
looks to pull our understanding of education back in line with our longstanding values. The effort
to do so existed long before my writing this and will certainly need to continue long after it, but
this fact should not discourage us. If anything, working through the same questions that bothered
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our predecessors and should bother generations to come shows that we are engaging with a
worthy exercise.
It is also worth noting that my interpretation of our founding values and the logic that
follows from them will not be consistent with everyone’s within our pluralistic society. If it did,
and we had a continuous set of values from sea to shining sea, I suspect we would have solved
many of our lingering problems long ago. If I was not completely confident, however, in the
vision of education that I and others have seen through the ideas of these authors, I would have
chosen a different interpretation. It seems quite unlikely to me that many would disagree with the
argument that we should increase the accessibility of intellectualism and spirituality within our
society. That said, there is certainly a lot we can learn from each other and the various
perspectives on our nation’s values and education that persist, even those that disagree with my
argument for increased access.
With those disclaimers out of the way, there are still some lingering questions about how
exactly these ambiguous ideals of intellectual and spiritual access might operate within a
classroom or schooling community. Here, Rancière, Jefferson, and Alexander offer up at least
three components worthy of our consideration. Though these components do not directly overlap
or relate to one another, they are in no way contradictory or mutually exclusive. Together they
represent a robust start in thinking about the practicability of these forms of access, one we can
hopefully build on in our ongoing efforts to improve American education. Additionally, these
aspects of intellectuospiritual education begin to answer some of the questions I have yet to
satisfactorily address, such as what exactly to make of the separation between Church and State
and how to balance the private and public life in this approach to education.
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The first aspect, brought out by Rancière’s redefinition of intellect, looks at the
consequences of a truth that is constructed through discourse. Using analogies to poetry and
linguistic translation, this strategy has a lot to say about how students should relate to each other,
their instructors, and the content of their education. It advocates for a form of empathetic
engagement that could be both practically fruitful and foundational for the formation of healthy
educational communities. The second aspect, suggested by both Rancière and Jefferson, is
equally crucial for the maintenance of these communities. A complete understanding of how our
private and public world map onto our educational efforts allows students and teachers alike to
maintain proper boundaries. It also answers some questions about both jurisdiction for curricular
and administrative decisions and the educational obligations each of us carries. Among those
obligations, Alexander adds, is a full reckoning with the role of religious and spiritual elements
within the life of a school. This, along with a renewed sense of the responsibility schools owe to
religious and spiritual institutions, represents the third and final aspect I will discuss here. In
thinking about this final component, Nash and other authors help to deconstruct the wall between
Church and State and redefine our understanding of that important relationship. Together, these
three characteristics of intellectuospiritual education begin to open a window into how the ideas I
have been playing with here might enter the day-to-day lives of educators and students.

Intellect in Discourse
The latter parts of Rancière’s work are among his most ambitious. In them, he describes
how our attention and liberty work in tandem with a James-like understanding of truth. Here,
attention and liberty serve as the operative and intuitive parts of this vision, and it is worth
further exploring the concept of truth they are working with. Remember that James’s view of
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truth looks at beliefs that serve a purpose in our lives and argues that they can be considered
truths as long as they can be traced to verifiable realities.185 Like Rancière, the trueness of
something revolves around how useful it is in our efforts to relate to the world around us as well
as its ability to be verified using our senses, historical precedent, and logical reasoning. While
focusing on constructed truths, James pushes questions about absolute truth either to the side or
beyond our ability to reckon with. For him, human finitude and fallibility are important
assumptions. He is not interested in the idea that humans can wrap their minds around the
absolute in any meaningful way. Instead, he focuses on how knowledge is founded on our
personal store of ‘working truths’.186
Rancière, as I mentioned, steps in from a similar angle, choosing to compare these
working truths to a translation of experiences into poetic forms. In this model, translation
becomes the focus of our activity. Rancière argues that we are all poets and that the poetry we
make is our attempt to take in and record the ideas, lives, and thoughts of those around us. Just
like a painter looking to express their experiences of reality, we make an earnest effort to record
what we consider to be true. These expressions are also driven by our desire to have our
experiences verified by others around us. Rancière refers to this as our “poetic virtue,” through
which we try to “communicate our feelings and see them shared by other feeling beings.”187 Not
only does this communication and validation in the company of others make us feel less alone in
our struggles and experiences, but it also serves as an anchor for comparing our perceptions and
grounding our stances. It gives us both a home and a community.
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Because of this, poetically constructed truth is a boon for efforts to build educational
communities, especially in schools. The assumptions we bring to a process of translation create
an atmosphere that is truly collegial and genuine. Contrast this with our current schooling efforts,
often defined by cutthroat standardized testing, student comparison, and reward-based
motivation. It is not hard to imagine the positive consequences that could result from this simple
change in mindset. Not only could the influx of empathetic teachers and classmates improve
students’ mental health, but the community as a whole will very likely be able to accomplish
much more through concerted effort than they ever could in competition with one another. If this
sounds overly optimistic, that is because it is built on a view of human nature that assumes we
each want to learn, to coexist peacefully, and have our needs met. Quite frankly, assuming
anything else sets us up for failure before we even begin.
Educational thought that strikes this optimistic tone is often, rightfully, criticized for
being too content with mediocrity and underachievement. These criticisms fall flat, however, for
two reasons. The first is that systems based on relative measures of student performance are
equally vulnerable to mediocrity. This may feel counterintuitive because we often think that
cutthroat, competitive mindsets breed further success, but we should not be so quick to think this
is an absolute. If we only care about our children scoring higher on certain metrics than their
peers in other classrooms, districts, states, or countries, there is absolutely no floor. Nothing, in
other words, is keeping us from a race to the bottom, where we remain on top of the rankings
despite the absolute ability and achievement of our students’ entering a free-fall. There is a lot to
be said for the value of discipline and self-competition but measuring success on relative terms is
no guarantee of improved performance. Attacking positive pedagogy because of the potential for
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mediocre performance will always fall flat for that reason: alternative approaches have proven no
more successful at creating our desired results.
The second point, however, speaks more substantively to the merits of Rancière’s
optimism. While he makes claims about coexistence, equal access, and collegiality, he never
loses sight of the importance of hard work. The process of adequately expressing and verifying
our thoughts is an inherently difficult task, one that pushes us well beyond what we currently
demand of students in most settings. What is more, his vision exists in a larger societal context
that depends on the efforts of people in order to survive. Effort is at a premium, even as he takes
a ‘soft’ approach. Every element of a truly democratic and republican society asks for a
relentless pursuit of our best selves. Democratic republicans cannot redistribute blame for their
failures, since the response-ability and responsibility both fall squarely on each person’s
shoulders. Optimism only becomes problematic when accompanied by lower standards, a
concern Rancière effectively distances himself from.
In part, this is why the idea of absolute truth is so uninteresting to Rancière. For him, like
for James, absolute truth represents something distinct and entirely apart from discourse.
Because of this, it also exists apart from the hard work that defines his vision of intellect. This is
not to say that absolute truth makes us lazy, but it does demand a lot less from us than the truths
that we construct together. Those ideas we work hard to express and the discursive truths they
create, then, represent a mere translation of our experiences. Our translations, in turn, become
meaningful when others put in the work to ‘counter-translate’ them.188 This mere translation is
far from insignificant. It is, rather, the closest that our innately imperfect human minds can come
to absolute truth. Through translation, we invite these counter-translation processes that both
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develop our empathetic efforts and put them in terms of another person’s experiences with
reality.
The word translation encapsulates it perfectly. Our attempts to express our experiences
with truth are like exchanging conversation through translation into various languages; the
translation is never a pure representation of the original message and we inevitably take some
creative license to try to understand what the other person meant to say. Our goal, regardless of
the license we choose to take, is always trying to understand the experiences of others and the
meaning they derive from those experiences. In this sense, our exchanges are not just potentially
empathetic, but are inevitably so, because we are always working to consider the context of the
other person and how it shapes their interactions with us.
To communicate like this, however, we need to assume that we have equal intellectual
access to those who engage with our translations, otherwise they would not be able to understand
our expressions. A painter who creates works with inaccessible meaning is bound for a lonely
and futile life, assuming, as Rancière does, that we paint to have others understand our
perspectives. Similarly, people who believe in ‘high art’ that requires a refined palette doom
themselves to an exclusive and limited social realm. All true art is made for mutual enjoyment
and is written in a language we are all able to speak. This mutuality and translation of experience
is an innate part of the power art holds in our lives. If we embrace this view, it follows that
educators should bring their students to the point where they feel confident echoing Rancière’s
declaration: “me too, I’m a painter.”189 This simple but potent expression boldly asserts that the
speaker and hearer are equally capable of translating their experiences into the field of “intellect”
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and counter-translating the works offered by others before them. It is a statement that recognizes
our qualifications to partake in exchanges of human experience.
Maxine Greene offers a similar idea when she discusses a form of education that enables
us to tap more fully into substantive forms of freedom, a term that we might connect tightly with
the ideas of access Rancière provides. In her work, The Dialectic of Freedom, she touts the idea
of a person’s authorship, their freedom to construct a narrative without regard for the confines of
predetermined roles or norms. Through interaction with the arts, particularly novels, students can
become adept at observing the process of authorship (counter-translation) and thinking about
their own authorial efforts (translation).190 Greene, like Rancière, believes that the ability to
grapple with our natality or newness, an idea borrowed from Arendt, will free us from the
oppressive forces of the world as we see it. She writes about the need “to name obstacles” and
take “action together to overcome” those obstacles.191 Rancière’s principal concern, the
hierarchical and limiting teacher-student relationship, is a prime example of the status quo
Greene is imploring us to surpass. All it takes, it would seem, is a slight shift in how we
approach education, focusing more acutely on discussions surrounding authorship in literature.
Such activities, however, are not limited to English courses and would not be particularly useful
if they were. All disciplines offer us the opportunity to think of their work in terms of how they
help us understand our lives and the stagnant structures that exist around us.
Our modern approach to education misses a crucial opportunity to engage students with
these opportunities. We communicate to students that they can become confident in their
painting and translating abilities once they graduate, but, until that time, they should lack
confidence in these abilities and should depend on the teacher to help them translate in bite-sized

190
191

Maxine Greene, The Dialectic of Freedom (New York City: Teachers College Press, 2018).
Greene, The Dialectic of Freedom, 2018, p. 101.

109
portions. Students who become too confident in their abilities too quickly, we tell ourselves, are
likely to miss key steps along the way and enter the world with an incomplete foundation for
adulthood. Therefore, adults are necessary primarily for keeping student confidence low so they
can lay this foundation on the students’ behalf. We will eventually let students loose on the
world and give them their authorial freedom, but only once we think they are ready. There is, no
doubt, some merit in this protectionism and its ability to ground students in the reality of their
inexperience or counterbalance their overconfidence. There are many times students might be
too cavalier in their attempts to take on projects they have not prepared for. In these times,
cautious warnings can be important, especially if the student might find themself in danger due
to their bullishness. This caution becomes dangerous, however, when we use a student’s lack of
experience to justify a limiting and hierarchical view of intellectual access. Our current system
has crossed this line and moved from helpful caution that guides student opportunities to an
oppressive limitation within those opportunities.
This limiting view is both unhealthy and dehumanizing, and it is far from the only system
of education we can construct. In contrast with the explicators and facilitators of traditional
instruction, Rancière’s ideal instructor occupies two roles: interrogator and verifier.192 The first
role involves demanding responses from students and encouraging them to articulate their
experiences. As the word “interrogator” suggests, we can accomplish this most fruitfully by
asking the students questions and holding them accountable for answering them fully. These
questions should not be simple exam-style questions with cut and dry answers students can
memorize. They should, instead, be deeper, more meaningful questions that require the student
to provide complex explanations and justifications of an idea they have or agree with.
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Teachers do not always need to be the sole questioner, however; students can gain just as
much from questioning each other. This model of interrogation brings us back to the
fundamental assumption that students are capable of responding as full human beings. In the
process of pushing students in this way, the instructor also exposes them to a world beyond the
local, which can stretch their curiosities further than they otherwise might reach on their own.
Regardless of who is asking the question, the important factor is that the emphasis remains on
the student as a complete person at the center of their learning experience. Rancière calls us to
insert this respect for students, where before we might have considered them to be objects in the
process of human completion. The instructor’s role, in the process of interrogation, then becomes
the act of a fellow complete person working alongside the student and spurring them on in their
efforts to develop more fully.
Working in tandem with interrogation, the verification process looks to further hold
students accountable. Here, they are accountable not to the truthfulness of their responses, as the
classic use of “verification” might suggest, but to the effort to remain “always searching” and
attentive.193 The unrelenting desire to learn replaces ‘correctness’ as the ultimate value in the
education process. A student might answer a math question wrong a dozen times but as long as
they continue working to get closer to the truth, then they meet the demands of verification. The
only punishable offense is inattention or laziness. Students take on a new life within this
approach as it asks them to relentlessly reflect on and articulate their observations. No corner of
education is beyond their reach in the right circumstances and with the right amount of hard
work. The latter point is key. Rancière does not argue that his approach destroys the natural
barriers to accessing higher reaches and deeper depths of knowledge. Those necessary
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intermediate steps are very much alive. He recognizes that much of what humans can know is
cumulative and that students will need to learn the foundational material before moving to more
complicated ideas. Where his approach differs from the current one is its emphasis on dialogue
and authorship as well as its removal of the unnatural limitations we often construct when we
have a limited view of intellectual access.
In addition to the other shifts in thinking at play here, this model also gets rid of the idea
that teachers are a repository of correct answers. Instead of being a knowledge bank, teachers
take up a position as fellow humans pushing their students to search for truths and the realities
that ground their conclusions. Rancière’s teachers retain their professionalism and authority as
long as they pride themselves on their ability to expand curiosities, provoke responses, and hold
students accountable to constant effort. Their profession becomes one of action, respect for the
humans they work alongside, and mastery in the art of nurturing educational relationships. This
role, as I mentioned, also represents a stark departure from our traditional conception of
teaching, which emphasizes the ability to bestow knowledge, hold students at a distance, and
maintain an intellectual boundary between the two parties. As stark as the contrast may be, the
distinguishing features of this new professionalism bring us a great deal closer to our democratic
and republican ideals than traditional manners of teaching ever could. Additionally, this
professional role works in conjunction with Greene’s vision of empathetic, narrative, and
discourse-based courses to give us a clear sense of the basic values and goals teachers should
have for their classrooms.
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Personal Methods, Civic Goals
This increased personalism within educational efforts reminds us of the importance of
carefully defining the limits of our public and private lives, especially as they relate to schooling.
A clearer definition, here, also plays a crucial role in understanding how an education operates
within the context of our democratic republican government. Having a grasp of how the privatepublic relationship informs our obligations, abilities, authorities, and interrelations should be an
integral part of American citizenship. The immense task Rancière and James present to us, in
working to take ownership of our democratic republic, marks a shift away from how we
currently understand citizenship. It is a shift that demands more from us than we are accustomed
to giving. Where before we might have deferred certain components of our civic duties to
politicians, Rancière echoes Jefferson and calls us to take up these responsibilities ourselves. The
onus for sustaining our system of government shifts away from experts or from the state and into
our hands. Much of our life, then, becomes a complicated dance between these private
obligations and the public responsiveness required by democracy.
The need for this private-public understanding is also found in our preparation for
engagement with public life, understood broadly as our education. The discourse begins with the
fact that, in a democratic republic, we have the power and the obligation to take advantage of our
educational opportunities. We are, as I have been saying, both response-able and responsible. In
this sense, our education becomes an individual and private concern. Its methods are personally
determined and require our full ownership of the process. Teachers can propose activities that
might be helpful, can provide crucial guidance, and can even model those elements of an
education that might be most helpful. They cannot, however, complete an education for the
student. Democratic republican students, in particular, are solely accountable for choosing what
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they will do in their education and for taking the initiative to actually do those things. We
endanger our form of government if we hand off this responsibility to others, search for
shortcuts, or otherwise try to shirk the necessary preparation for citizenship. Each of us alone can
cultivate the dynamic qualities we need to become a useful party in discourse and an effective
check against tyrannical government. Rancière and our republican tendencies push us to
emancipate ourselves and to recognize our equal capabilities, but emancipation and capability
bring with them responsibility and relentless hard work. Put differently, though the methods may
be private, freedom in a democratic republic still never means freedom from effort, and
educational autonomy is no different.
Those interested in the intellectuospiritual approach that I am discussing in this work
should not neglect this important form of educational privacy. It affords students security in the
methodological and effortful decisions that they make. No one can or should mandate specific
ways they must apply themselves throughout their interactions with schools, except of course
when the safety of others is at stake. Even further, we should make an effort to instill this sense
of privacy and agency in students early and often. I can remember countless times early in my
education where I would finish a project and rush to the teacher to hear what the next errand on
the list was. No one should doubt that completing tasks quickly and correctly provided me with a
great deal of confidence in my abilities, but without the teacher’s next proscribed activity that
confidence would have quickly vanished. Not until much later did my athletic experiences and
introduction to the process of ‘intellectual scholarship’ give me the sense that I both could and
should take ownership of my own educational processes. I had coaches who would drill into us
that perpetual question: ‘what are you doing when no one’s watching?’ Not what are you doing
from the list of requirements I have presented. What are you doing by yourself, for yourself, with
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no one else caring or holding you accountable? This, to me, is the epitome of an education with
private and responsible methods.
The first of Rancière’s intellectual engines, expression, can only truly be achieved if
students are free to respond however they would like to those things that present questions and
curiosity. It should be the verification process, rather than artificial curricular boundaries, that
places checks on their free-wheeling expressions. Here, however, the educational process quickly
begins to sound flaky and free-spirited and no longer rules out the dangerous possibility of
homeschooling or isolated private academies. Even homeschooling and private academies can
provide all of the necessary ingredients for an education that respects the private methods of a
student and gives them the freedom to explore their intellectual potential. Expression and
verification can both occur with as much effectiveness in private tutoring as they can anywhere
else. What they lack, however, is an understanding of how important and central a public
orientation is to democratic republican education.
At the same time that we recognize a student’s freedom and privacy, we also see that the
larger public community takes an acute interest in ensuring our preparedness. On a basic level,
well-equipped citizens are necessary for its survival. Specifically in the context of a democratic
republic, the education of citizens is both a means of preservation and, as a consequence, a
public concern. Because of this, any person hoping to partake in the political life of a healthy
republic must regard the education of their fellow citizens as equally important to their own.
There are no people in the entirety of the human species that are more deserving of their
education than any others. This idea seems radical in our modern, consumerist American
framework because, plainly stated, it is. We may be accustomed to regard education as a
consumer product that we can exploit. We privatize it in all of the wrong ways, aiming to use it
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to serve our needs or preserve certain ideological ends. Education, as a marketed product,
becomes more of a pointed weapon than a blossoming fuel cell. We become, understandably,
protectionist, nativist, and individualistic, but the nature of our republic begs us to avoid that
view. Privacy belongs to the students and remains in the methodology. The goals of our
education push us to look outward towards the public.
We often take Lincoln’s famous idea that a divided house cannot survive to mean two
distinct sides in opposition to each other. Pictures of simple political division are so ever-present
to us, that I think we miss an equally important interpretation of this idea. A government that
relies on the responsibility and efforts of its citizens cannot survive if the citizens do not want to
live in community. Our American house cannot afford to be divided into more than three
hundred million pieces. Arendt discusses this danger in her analysis of totalitarian tendencies,
pointing out that the ‘atomization’ of a society creates the belief that community is either not
possible or not worth the effort it might require.194 Not only, then, is the education of republican
citizens a prerequisite to the health of that republic, but some semblance of public- or civicmindedness is crucial as well. The goal of this education is primarily the maintenance of our
government and community with that community ultimately being a tool for the public good.
Our republicanism calls us to recognize our education as a vital tool for perpetuating the public
we have established, even as we recognize the equally necessary privacy. The form of citizenship
that it supports involves recognizing both our unique educational authority, our privacy, and the
civic importance of our education, our public-ness. In this sense, all education in a republic is
civic education, not because it directly concerns civic participation, but because the motivating
force for that education is the civic good. This is the dual demand we accept in establishing a
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democratic republic: (1) sole responsibility for and freedom over our personal growth and (2)
dedication of that growth to the good of our neighbors.
If we were to argue, instead, that the goals of our education are private, we would be
inviting selfishness into a system of governance that relies on interdependence. A republic could
not very easily find a direction that serves the public good if each person was only concerned
with their own interests. Several elements of our society already mirror this paranoid market
orientation to some degree. A level of social orientation and interest in affairs beyond our selves
is crucial for accomplishing a well-rounded image of public wellbeing and democratic republican
education. This is not to say that a citizen cannot be self-full195—concerned with both our self
and the public in a non-exclusive manner—but rather to point out that the success of our
community relies on our willingness to mind the public interest. The noticeable American
tendency towards isolationism and self-reliance, here, is an unhealthy outgrowth of
responsibility. A republic demands citizens that are responsible, but not to the extreme that they
neglect the very communal world over which the republic hangs. This is the reason a deeply
personal form of education like that which Rancière promotes cannot primarily serve private
goals in a democratic republic. We should still reach for our personal aspirations, but they
remain secondary or incidental to those necessary for the public good. It is this, too, that
counteracts some of the apprehensions we might have with student freedom. Seemingly the sole
requirement for them in their education, though there may be others as well, is that they
ultimately make use of their freedom for the public good, rather than their own narrow interests.
More often than not, in a well-run republic, the two will coincide.
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The methodology, unlike the orientation, must remain private, or else we risk lapsing into
the explicative forms of education Rancière so opposes. Just as an explicative teacher cannot
wield their expertise without taking something away from the student, a system of public
education cannot hang experts or uniform practices over local communities without implicitly
attacking the authority that locality holds. The way the public can express its concern for
education is by allowing it to run through localized authorities and providing resources that are
supportive instead of mandated. Dotts reminds us that Jefferson’s concept of ‘state-sponsored’
education “meant only that government would help fund education without determining the
curriculum.”196 This is the heart of the democratic-republican tension as it concerns education:
finding a healthy middle-ground between public overreach and private isolationism. Not
surprisingly, it mirrors the polarized political friction in modern American life, but with one key
difference: increased recognition of the need for responsibility. In turning to James, we find a
solution that rests within the political tension, encapsulated in an education of private methods
and public goals. Tangibly this might resemble a robust system of public schools, controlled
locally, and deferring to the agency of people, a system that in some ways resembles Jefferson’s
vision for education.
By laying out a vision of intellect that frees us to see equal accessibility and to take up
our civic burdens, Rancière and James inform educational thinking both on this, institutional
level and on the interpersonal level mentioned previously. Our freedom to take ownership of the
educational processes welcomes an institutional system that simultaneously demands local
autonomy over the mechanics and deliberative deference to public goals. At the interpersonal
level, it challenges us to cultivate a cultural atmosphere that deconstructs capacity-based
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hierarchies and regards all humans as equally endowed with potential. It pushes teachers into a
new professional role, one that provides authority justified by something more than fictitious
superiority. Most importantly, it reimagines what is possible for students, both in their personal
growth and in their ability to take up an active role in society. This educational vision, as it frees
us to see the possibilities that rest within us, paves the way for a society that is more empathetic
and truer to its democratic and republican ideals. It challenges us to move from the isolationist
pseudo-republic we have developed toward the authentically communal democratic republic that
our founding generation dreamed we might create. This grand vision of education is short on
details but ripe with actionable ideas, particularly in connection with this private-public
definition.

Schools as Sanctuaries
The final aspect I will discuss presents itself as an important extension of this struggle to
define the private-public. Keeping with James’s and Alexander’s ideas about the importance of
the spiritual in shaping complete people, we are left with questions about the specific role
schools can and should play in connecting with the spiritual. For Alexander, this role appears
most fruitfully as a dynamic embrace of spiritual questions and development. What is often taken
as a deeply personal element of our lives, religious and spiritual identity, is perhaps better
understood along the private-public lines previously mentioned. Namely, our spiritual
development is entirely within our scope of control but should be maintained with an eye toward
the public good. Students, in other words, should be free to pursue their spiritual growth however
they might like but need to do so with unselfish and publicly oriented motives. Our civic
obligations do not stop at the Church or Mosque doors any more than our religious obligations
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stop at the school doors. This approach to thinking about spirituality within an educational
setting has one immediate benefit: it actually squares perfectly with the idea that schools should
not tip the scales on religious questions. Arguing that students remain in control of the processes
and content of their education greatly minimizes the possibility of indoctrination or religious
biases. Instead, the teachers and students enter the religiously neutral educational space as
particular human beings engaging together openly with what their religious and spiritual lives
mean to them and how they connect with the other educational content at hand.
This is not the sole mechanism at play in an education of this form, however. Alexander
describes a substantive role that schools might be able to have in the religious and spiritual
development of students. The process of turning customs and rituals into ‘guideposts for living’
offers these educational communities a chance to connect with the religious organizations that
often exist wholly outside of the world of schooling. Schools must work within and for their
communities, and to pretend that religious institutions are not a part of that community is both
reckless and irresponsible. By working indiscriminately with all religious and spiritual
communities, they might also hope to avoid the charge that they are violating the sacred
separation between churches and the state. To be clear, I am not arguing here that schools should
begin holding religious services in their buildings, nor am I advocating for some vacuous and
bland spiritual ‘winter concert’ approach. There are no specific actions or programs, in fact, that
need to occur to meet the requirement of this intellectuospiritual approach. Rather schools need
to be open to potential ways teachers and students might engage with the religious and spiritual
life in their community.
There are opportunities here for schools to help make the traditions and customs that are
so valuable to many Americans, in and outside of their religious lives, meaningful and
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educationally relevant. Where students are currently trained to compartmentalize their lives and
view their religious experience as divorced from the world of education, this alternative approach
might open up new and important connections. This is especially the case for history courses,
which frequently feel the pressure to handle inevitable religious topics with care. It is not limited,
however, to discussions about the role of the Catholic church in our political history, for
example. Students might be able to think with critical reflection about the discipline that fasting
instills, the economic and moral principles behind charity and frugality, the role that images and
names play in shaping our discourse, and the rhetorical strategies common in religious
ceremonies. If we begin to think, as Alexander argues we should, of schools as spiritual
sanctuaries, we come closer to an understanding that learning is both sacred and intensely
relevant. We can connect even non-religious customs like the pledge of allegiance or fourth of
July fireworks to deeper sources of meaning and purpose. In a world that seems more
disconnected and arbitrary by the day for many people, these are worthy, though admittedly
challenging, goals.
An additional challenge arises in these efforts, felt more sharply here than in any other
part of our lives, about what to make of the different sects, denominations, and other religious
organizations that make up the body of learners that might coexist within a school. This diversity
immediately calls to mind the often-cited idea of pluralism. America has grown to be a country
that must constantly face the concerns that come with housing diverse religious, ethnic,
ideological, and cultural identities. It is a problem that we are better served leaning into than
leaning away from, particularly on issues as historically divisive as race and religion. In the
process of embracing the spiritual and religious development of their students, educational
communities are uniquely situated to act as a public sphere where these kinds of tensions can be
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addressed. The knee-jerk response may well be to apply a thick humanist gloss to the entirety of
our situation and to espouse the idea that ‘we are all one’ or that ‘we are more alike than we are
different.’ With a reminder of our human commonality in place, we might expect a greater
degree of conflict resolution and good grace towards one another.
For Suzanne Rosenblith, though, it is dangerous to have this expression of similarity as
our sole focus.197 We are, in fact, quite different in many substantive ways. To ignore this fact is
to invalidate a large portion of what brings someone their identity. Robert Wuthnow, working
from the same ideas as Rosenblith, extends a comparison between religious pluralism and
interreligious couples that helps demonstrate this point. He argues that couples where each
person holds a distinct set of beliefs will struggle to find a healthy, balanced relationship if they
simply gloss over the important areas of difference in their beliefs. It is akin to slapping duct tape
on a leaking pipe instead of working to permanently mend it. Instead, they need to “negotiate
with one another over an extended period of time” to work out compromises and draw important
lines in the sand.198 Without beginning from a firm sense of the contours and priorities of the
other, people in these relationships cannot expect to find harmony in the face of life’s
challenging questions. Many of us can probably remember being in or observing relationships
that lacked this principled compromise. They quickly take a toll on both people and place a
severe strain on the relationship itself. In time, the people involved are left with a choice between
beginning to take seriously the work they had previously neglected or ending the relationship,
with the only other option being remaining in near-constant and painful disagreement.
In essence, this half-developed interreligious relationship is what we have collectively
been accepting in our national relationships. Rosenblith, partly building on Wuthnow’s ideas,
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recognizes that educational institutions need to operate in the same manner a healthy couple
might: keying in on important differences instead of glossing them over.199 She and Wuthnow
make a distinction between religious pluralism that tries to instill empty tolerance and that which
is interpersonal and relational.200 This is where Rosenblith invokes Wunthow’s concept of
“reflective pluralism” as an alternative to the emptier forms of pluralism that dominate many
schools.201 Reflective pluralism, as alluded to before, moves us to pair our wishy-washy
tolerance with a strong sense of responsibility in how we truly respect others.202 Much like
Jefferson’s ideas concerning freedom and responsibility, it argues that we show respect through
an active process.203 A form of respect that merely looks to coexist with others falls short
because it refuses to acknowledge the real, substantive differences that shape our unique ways of
life.204 How, in good conscience, can you claim to fully respect someone if you have never taken
the time to work through and understand the core of their personal beliefs? Yet, all too often, this
is what we do with one another on several different fronts. It is in this discussion that Wunthow
and Rosenblith present a needle-threading solution to the problems Alexander poses about
pluralistic attitudes, especially in the context of religion.
Within the newly anointed sanctuary schools, students must take the time to learn about
the particulars of their peers, as fellow human beings. Beyond the traditional religious survey
course, they need to ask those questions that spark their curiosity and probe the differences
between the various traditions their classmates hold. Not only does this further hone the critical,
reflective, expressive, and empathetic skills of young students, but it will offer the chance to
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build more robust community as well. Some parents may worry that this kind of questioning
might lead their children away from the faith they were raised on. This may well be a valid
concern, but it is not without an answer and is, in any case, a price to be paid for living in a
society like America. We must, once and for all, rid ourselves of the illusion that life in our
country comes free of charge and sacrifice. Democratic republican citizens are not called to be
willfully ignorant of the costs needed to maintain our way of life but rather to understand and
shoulder a portion of those burdens dutifully and willingly.
That said, the concern of these parents does raise the important point that we should take
care to ensure that students do not take their native traditions lightly. Certainly, there needs to be
freedom for children and adults to leave their traditions for those they feel more closely aligned
with, but our democratic republic will be weakened if we allow ourselves to develop a ‘quitters
attitude’. Too often religious differences have been grounds, particularly within the Christian
church, to break off and start a new sect or a new institution instead of putting in the diligent
work to correct the issues within the existing framework. No one should be asked to remain
somewhere where they feel unsafe, but steps must also be taken to push for change from within
rather than demanding it from without. In part, by beginning to tackle religious issues within a
unified public institution like our schools, we are modeling this very practice for students to
evaluate and emulate. If we continue running away from these difficult tasks and reforms, our
students will take notice and may never do anything but run in their own lives.
Ultimately, the ideas Rosenblith and Wuthnow present concerning reflective pluralism do
the double work of placing a serious demand on both multiculturalism and religious institutions.
They see our tendency to avoid complicated issues by either isolating ourselves or
oversimplifying, and thus cheapening, significant religious and spiritual bodies. In response, they
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call multiculturalists to ground themselves in the concrete, objective ideas that bring a fullness
and uniqueness to various religions. They acknowledge the messiness this approach will
probably bring about, but enduring the mess is a necessary step if we ever want to move beyond
superficial forms of respect. On the other hand, they call religious groups to more fully embrace
the need for pluralism and multiculturalist sentiments.205 They do so knowing full well the
challenging implications this might have for deeply held convictions. For each side, reaching for
this harmony demands a good deal of work and a willingness to sit in the messiness, or even
danger, of adopting reflective pluralistic principles. In an American context, however, this
responsible form of pluralism is the most feasible and productive response to an increasingly
diverse nation. It offers us the opportunity to truly strive for a realization of the American
experiment, the cohesive body of factions our founding generation dreamed we might be. More
than that, it is a necessary step, in tandem with the other aspects discussed here, if we hope to
strive for a culture and educational system that increases our perceived intellectual and spiritual
access.
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Conclusion
We began, if you recall, with some brief thoughts about the nature of life in a democratic
republic, where people are given the responsibility to guard the liberties and futures of their
society. Thinkers from Jefferson, and even before, down through the present day have
emphasized the important consequences this way of organizing has for our systems of education.
The most important of these is that we must learn how to be autonomous thinkers within a larger
body and tradition. In short, we must learn to be intellectuals. We are not, however, called to be
the kinds of intellectuals we are used to thinking about: well-off professor-types living mostly on
our country’s coasts and spending most of their days in libraries. That definition, in addition to
being grossly oversimplified, has helped create numerous divisions in our political, cultural, and
educational worlds over the years. Understanding intellect in that way excludes the lion’s share
of our population from the act of being intellectual and, in the process, paints it as a luxury. In
essence, we have developed a model that is anything but the necessity our government suggests
it should be. To begin to see intellect as both necessary and popularly accessible, then, we need
to strip it down to its barest elements, elements most fully captured by the two-step formula
Rancière describes. This simple process, expression and verification, is one that interrupts the
feelings of hierarchy and exclusivity that often accompany the idea of intellect. It opens the
floodgates, in a way, to a fuller democratic republican society, one occupied by fully capable and
well-rounded citizens.
It does so, as Arendt helps us understand, by replacing the pseudo-confidence that
dominates American discourse with a genuine belief in our self-efficacy. Arendt discusses the
danger of people who do not think they are capable of keeping themselves company in their
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ideas, who turn to ideologies and cable news platforms to guide their actions.206 A quick survey
of your close friends and acquaintances might reveal many people in our country, and the larger
world, who would clearly recognize the centrality of both confidence and insecurity in
educational experiences. Whether it is your nephew throwing up his hands because he will never
be able to solve these darn math problems or the countless multitudes who claim they are ‘just
not artistic people,’ much has been said about the close connection between our schooling and
confidence. The crisis of confidence is as real in America as it has ever been, and it goes beyond
the lack of trust we have for our media. This crisis cuts to the heart of our identities. Throughout
the process of writing this work, I had numerous conversations with close friends and family
who expressed a belief that they could ‘never write that much’ or that ‘those kinds of readings
are just too philosophical for me.’ To the unsympathetic reformer, these remarks might sound
like whining or excuses for laziness. The task before us, however, is not to shame ourselves into
thinking that we can accomplish great feats. Instead, we need to show both the beauty and
approachability of those feats, particularly the greatest feat many in the Western world can
conceive: democratic republicanism.
This is where Rancière and James found us. A synthesis of their ideas, supported no
doubt by many others, revealed an intellect that is essential, inclusive, and intuitive. The first
described to us how fundamental acts of intellect are in our daily lives. Each of us, from the
moment of our birth, is reliant on the same educational process of stating and validating ideas. It
is how we learn our native language from our caregivers and create impressive works of
scholarship, as well as everything in between. Because of this, it is a process we all are capable
of engaging with. Not only that, but each of us is capable of engaging to an equal extent and with
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an equal effect. This is the second quality, and it is where equality and, less evidently, liberty
become crucial forces. We are liberated, Rancière argues, by the equality and confidence that a
welcoming sense of intellect can provide for us. Only, however, by making room for and
embracing intuitive processes, like those that often go hand in hand with the artistic qualities of
language, can we fully tap into the potential available to us in this intellect. Americans, as I have
argued, and people in general, find as much meaning in customs, traditions, and gut feelings as
they do in cold-hard reason. Intuition, then, becomes the third key quality of the rich intellectual
life Rancière is trying to establish.
This is also where spiritual issues fully entered our line of thinking. Built around nonrational qualities like faith and tradition, our spiritual and religious traditions not only need to
find room in our intellectual pursuits but in the larger body of work in schools. To enable this,
Alexander provides us with an expanded understanding of what spiritual life involves,
broadening the term to encompass both religious and non-religious forms of transcendent
community and individual activities. This kind of understanding flies in the face of the role
spirituality has traditionally played in America, that of a narrow set of occasionally
fundamentalist religious organizations barred from interfering with the business of the state.
While compartmentalizing our public and spiritual lives might often be the healthiest decision
for our culture, we should also understand that there are important ways we can and need to
develop holistic collaboration as well, something we have been avoiding for far too long.
Here is where educational questions really take hold and push us towards an
intellectuospiritual understanding of what we can achieve if we take our founding values and
obligations seriously. An education system that prioritizes intellectual and spiritual access, found
through the synthesis of many great works and ideas provides us with that chance to return to our
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roots. Though this approach does not provide any concrete steps, I have explored three central
ideas connected to the life of schools that begin to nod towards practical application. The first
focused on the development of intellect through discourse both with a student’s peers and with
their teachers. Drawing, in many ways, on the same ideas that have inspired thinkers like Maxine
Greene, this approach to truth-seeking and personal development aims to teach us through
empathetic and active engagement with each other’s stories. It is seemingly Arendtian in its
focus on other people as particular beings from whom we can learn. This shift may not seem
radical, but it becomes more drastic when we consider the often cutthroat competition that makes
up much of American education. Where we currently have an impersonal and isolating form of
interpersonal competition, the ideas explored here, through the lens of intellectuospiritualism,
offer us the chance to find a deeply connected collegiality in our growth and development.
This, of course, sets up the need for clearer distinctions between the public and private
world, as does any effort that brings humans into closer contact with each other. By establishing
a proposal for education that has inherently personal methods and inherently civic goals,
intellectuospiritualism helps us define the contours of this private-public relationship. The
ultimate say in educational decisions belongs to the individual student, but their public
orientation ensures that they cannot simply pick whatever is most convenient for their ease or
personal preferences. We can take this to say that no curricular decisions should be made for the
students or we can see it as merely meaning that we should make more room for student
curiosities in the curriculum. The main problem with the latter, I would argue, is that we have
been trying to do something to this effect for the better part of a century. It may, indeed, be time
for a more radical approach, one that trusts students to make informed decisions about what they
study, using their interests as a guide. With any luck, a trusting philosophy that values
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responsibility in this way might begin to permeate the wider culture and bring us closer to our
democratic republican ideals.
The final discussion, which I connected with this private-public relationship, concerned
the idea that schools can be regarded as sanctuaries, places where students can actively engage
with and explore their faiths and spiritualities. Our present desire to keep the divine out of the
schoolhouse may come from good intentions and strong reasoning, but there is no denying that it
has firmly separated our religious or spiritual lives from our educational lives, to the detriment of
each. It is rare, nowadays, to find anything other than a dry survey course within the context of
religious organizations. Mainstream religious instruction, undeniably an important partner to
larger educational projects for those who subscribe to religious beliefs, currently does little to
reinforce the importance of empathy, mutual respect, critical thinking, and intellect more
generally. This is to say nothing of the state of spiritual instruction, which often feels more like a
scattershot than any sort of serious endeavor. By bringing schools and the religious-spiritual
world into closer connection, we might be able to capture more of the rigor that is so important
in educational projects. Our efforts to view schools more as sanctuaries, however, require a
special form of pluralism, like the one offered up by Rosenblith and Wuthnow. This pluralism
places more demands on us than the traditional, soft idea of pluralism. It asks us, in short, to truly
do our due diligence in understanding what makes someone tick. By doing this, it creates an
intersection between the private and public that blends discursive truth together with the
intensely meaningful activities of our spiritual and religious lives.
These potential extensions of an intellectuospiritual approach are far from its only
offerings, but they do begin to give a sense of how we can run with these ideas. Far from an
entirely novel way of understanding education, it is my hope that through these reflections on a
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number of well-regarded authors and ideas I have presented a convincing case that spiritual and
intellectual inaccessibility are serious issues in American education. Our children deserve to train
and develop themselves in an educational community that instills confidence in their abilities and
recognizes every area of their life as a potential source of growth. A well-known neuroscience
misconception argues that we only make use of ten percent of our brain. Though this idea is
false, if we continue to proceed with a limited understanding of intellect that makes use of only
ten percent of our collective intellectual power, we may turn this into a reality.
Combine this with the countless missed opportunities we allow when we exclude religion
and spirituality from our educational conversations and a stark picture emerges. American
education is underachieving in ways that have been previously identified but have seemingly
escaped our focus. This mediocrity is driven by a political right that pushes for standardized
tests, laughs at the idea that curiosity should drive learning, and fights for the ability to opt out of
our public educational communities. It comes, in equal measure, from a political left that
imposes an educational restraining order on religious questions, champions relativistic notions,
and compromises high standards for student comfort. I am not looking to paint our political
affinities with a broad brush, but rather to gesture to the ideas each side of the political aisle has
contributed to the detriment of our national intellectuospiritual health. The path to overcoming
our mediocrity is not found through leaning to one side or the other. Doing that would, once
again, leave too much on the table and handicap our children. Instead, the path forward comes
through embracing a Jamesian pragmatism that constructs new understandings of responsibility,
response-ability, liberty, equality, and truth in education, remembering, at the same time, James’s
commitment to the importance of religion.
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As to whether we can actually achieve these dreams in our public schooling system, it
seems important to note, as Hofstadter does, that these tensions have existed for a long time and
likely will not find a simple resolution in the near future. Presenting what I have done here as
anything more than a synthesis of great ideas about education, flavored with my personal
preferences and academic affinities, would be irresponsible. I will leave the development of
practical models of schooling to those who have dedicated their lives to teaching and curricular
development. They are better suited to deal with the complexities that result from the
straightforward but, no doubt, challenging philosophy recapped here. It is my hope, in dipping
my toes into the river of discourse that has existed on these issues for generations, that this river
will continue to rage with all the passions and muses we are capable of bringing to the table. Any
less would be a disservice to ourselves, our children, and future generations, not to mention the
countless thinkers who have dedicated themselves to getting to this point.
Our individual obligations are not limited to those interested in studying educational
ideas, however. What stands before us all has likely always stood before us in varying degrees of
plainness: the reality that we have work to do to fully realize our democratic and republican
ideals. The arguments laid forth by James and Rancière call us to reengage with this reality,
especially as we stand in divisive and hostile times. How better to bridge the divides that slow
our responses to global pandemics and racial tensions than to reconceptualize our view of
discourse and our view of each other. The authors I have engaged with here provide a next step
in that direction, but they would be among the first to acknowledge that there is, and will always
be, more work to be done. That is part of the beauty of this process and of the great American
experiment. It will never be perfect, nor will it ever be complete, but it will always offer us the
opportunity to realize a better world for ourselves and those around us. By no means will we be
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able to make great strides in becoming more democratic, liberated, and considerate of each other
overnight, but we can and should resolve to do the work, nonetheless. We are privileged to
belong to an intellectual and cultural tradition that openly recognizes our ability to constantly be
at work. People across the world protest, fight, and die for the ideals that shape a democratic
republic, ideals that our founding generation laid on the table for us to pick up and run with.
The path forward is, as I have said, simple but challenging. On an individual level, it
begins with enacting this view of equal intellectual and spiritual capacity in our personal
interactions and relationships. Constant awareness of those hierarchical phrases, jokes, and
comments that can sneak into our conversations is crucial. So too are our efforts to reform our
places of business, our religious institutions, our local political landscapes, and, most critically,
our schools. The tendency to look for and to exploit opportunities for advancement above others
is arguably an innate human instinct. The principles of a democratic republic, however, ask us to
fight those instincts at the same time we are fighting our urge to pass our political power onto
representatives and institutions. These smaller-scale efforts, combined with continuing
theoretical and practical work reflecting on our democratic and republican efforts, are crucial in
working to bring our country closer to the best society it can possibly be. The accountability and
deliberative discourse we can open up through these processes will not only bring us closer to
that ideal but will reestablish a trend of reflective hard work that our founding generation looked
to set in motion years ago. It will renew and reengage the ceaseless American activities that at
one point made our system of governance the envy of the world. What is left for each of us is to
realize the possibility and to take action.
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